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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way"—however dimly, and lost among the host—as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

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"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

"Our voice is raised for spiritual freedom, and our plea made for enfranchisement from all tyranny, whether of SCIENCE or THEOLOGY."

These words came to our mind when we were perusing the reports of many speeches delivered on the day of Gandhiji's Martyrdom—30th January. Those words were penned by H. P. Blavatsky in the first volume of her first book, *Isis Unveiled*, published in 1877. She was deeply sensible of the titanic struggle of our civilization that was developing then and which now is in full and fast swing.

In the last quarter of the 19th century the great war of ideas was waging. The two opposing ideas were—the quest and application to life of the laws of the true knowledge of the Immortal Sages, and the pursuing of a course which bifurcated into the opposing blocs of materialistic science and superstitious theology, both dogmatic, each in its own way.

That war of ideas brought forth many vital changes in human thinking. On every plane—scientific and religious, philosophical and social, political and economic—revolution in and of knowledge took place. In the midst of the babel of tongues of that pedagogic revolution a silent spiritual renaissance came to birth and has been silently progressing. The number of natural born mystics was greatly augmented by those who educated themselves in mystical thinking and living. This was before the close of the century. Among poets and novelists and other creative artists mystical expressions became more pronounced. And, furthermore, mystics of rare quality arose all over the world; some became known but most have remained unrecognized. The process is continuing. India produced its own crop of mystics in the wake of Ram Mohan Roy—Dayanand Saraswati, Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Ramanarishi, and the greatest and profoundest of them all—Gandhiji.

The tragedy of Gandhiji's martyrdom was dual: his passing combin-

ed the tragedy of Abraham Lincoln, the hero of Nationalism, and that of Jesus Christ, the hero of the Kingdom of the Spirit. It is but natural that India reveres Gandhiji as the Father of the Nation, while the world at large reveres him as the Man of Spirit, the Man of God.

Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, speaking at Sevagram, struck the true note :—

The world today is in greater need of Gandhiji's teachings of peace and universal brotherhood than ever before.

Similarly, India's leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, advised the children to try their hardest to unify the people of India despite the many diversities among them of language, culture and religion. Also, he charged the adults to broaden their hearts and to develop national unity. He rightly pointed out that " political freedom is not enough, we have to achieve economic freedom also. " But Gandhiji wanted more and ever emphasized the need of moral principles and ever spoke of spiritual freedom. We missed that note in the reports of Shri Nehru's speeches, although he did point out the truth :—

Today is Mahatma Gandhi's day of martyrdom. If we merely express sorrow, then it will have no meaning. We have to look to Mahatma Gandhi's entire life, understand his principles and teachings and learn from his vast achievements.

The economic independence of a politically free state is not enough. Was not that the burden of Gandhiji's teachings ? We must grant that the U. S. A. enjoys economic independence and so does the U. S. S. R., but are the peoples of these States happy, contented, enlightened, ready to enhance intelligently the cause of peace and of one world ? As political freedom without economic freedom does not suffice, so both these freedoms without real spiritual freedom do not suffice. We cannot do better than quote these words of Gandhiji from *Harijan* of 2nd January, 1937 :—

Let there be no mistake about my conception of Swaraj. It is complete independence of alien control and complete economic independence. So at one end you have political independence, at the other economic. It has two other ends. One of them is moral and social, the corresponding end is Dharma, *i.e.*, religion in the highest sense of the term. It includes Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, etc., but is superior to them all....

By political independence I mean ...sovereignty of the people based on pure moral authority....Economic independence is not a product of industrialization of the modern or the Western type. Indian economic independence means to me the economic uplift of every individual male and female by his or her own conscious effort....I have no doubt that we can make as good an approach to it as is possible for any nation, not excluding Russia, and that without violence.

SHRAVAKA

HOW SHOULD PRISONERS BE TREATED?

[This useful essay by **Miss Margery Fry,** who is now one of the Vice-Presidents of the Howard League for Penal Reform in England, as well as a Member of the Home Office Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders and of the Advisory Council of the Colonial Office on Social Welfare, should provoke needed thought on a serious and pressing current problem. " The best way to treat prisoners is not to make them, " writes Miss Fry. True, but only a society based on spiritual principles could achieve this. The scientific spiritual principles which underlie those " austere and noble virtues " mentioned by Miss Fry, with suggestions for implementing them, are recorded for our use. But their practical application to our many problems awaits a sufficient number of those " good men " (also mentioned by Miss Fry), who, convinced of the power of Truth, will base their service of their fellows on the verity that man *is* a Soul and that reincarnation and Karma are facts in Nature.—ED.]

Many years ago I visited a large prison in one of the smaller American countries (I shall not name it, for I have reason to hope that its penal system has been much reformed since then). My remembrance of this prison is like a scene from Dante's *Inferno*. From one foul den you passed to another till you came to the innermost enclosure of all, a dark space in which a crowd of men moved like beasts in a cage, shut off by an iron railing. Their temper was so savage that not even the guards dared go amongst them. Some cigarettes which I brought for them had to be handed through the bars. One young man, from the United States, spoke to me as I stood outside. In a blind fit of drunkenness he had committed some grave crime, and saw no hope of ever returning to the life of a human being.

A few weeks ago I visited another prison, in England. It is for women only, but it is one of the several in the country and many in the world (some for men, some for women), of the new " open " institution type. It is perhaps one of the few blessings of an impoverished world that governments now hesitate to build vast and costly fortresses to contain offenders, having realized how many men and women, even those who have committed grave offences, can be kept under partly or wholly " open " conditions, though generally with the threat of closer confinement if they attempt escape.

In the north of England, in a country house, about 50 women are serving their sentences of imprisonment. The gate stands open, the house door is unlocked, at their free times you may see them in the rather attractive garden, on the lawns or by the pool and hear shouts and cheerful laughter. A bell calls them back to sewing, laundry or housework in light, airy rooms, or to

garden or field work outside. When the day's labour is done, there are classes organized by the Education Authority or taught by members of the staff, giving them a chance to learn school subjects, singing, dancing, house decorating or painting, or even to produce a play. If they save up enough from their very small earnings the women may go in company with one of their officers (none of them in clothes which would mark them as coming from the prison) to a cinema in the nearest town.

Whilst they are still in prison schemes are being made for their welfare after release: almost every evening, the Governor, a wise and sympathetic woman, sits in her room to receive anyone who wants to discuss plans or difficulties with her. For, in spite of its general air of purposeful cheerfulness, one cannot forget that this is a place where each woman carries a heavy load of care and apprehension, of anxiety for her family outside, or dread of the future and perhaps of remorse for the past, since many of them have committed grievous crimes.

Between the two prisons I have mentioned there lies a chasm even greater than that which divides the physical lives of the people in them. It is a greater difference even than is between the lack of humanity shown in the first case and its abundant evidence in the second. It is nothing less than the difference between looking forward and looking backward. In the prison described as an inferno, nothing counted but the past crime of the convict; in the women's prison attention is directed entirely towards trying to ensure that the future shall see no reversions to crime. In the seven years of its existence, 95 per cent of the women who have passed through it have, to use the popular phrase, "gone straight"—they have not reappeared in the Courts.

We have here a clue to one of the main principles now recognized as of primary importance in the treatment of offenders. Not for their sakes only, but even more for the sake of the society to which they will return, they must, if possible, be released to lead a life of good citizenship.

No desire for revenge can justify any form of treatment which makes those who undergo it more dangerous enemies of their fellow citizens than they were before.

Probably almost everyone would agree with this general statement. The difficulty is, how should we treat criminals in order to protect society from them in the future? There have been times when countries which called themselves civilized met this question by wholesale executions. This removed all risk of future depredations from the criminals caught, but it did not check crime. As long ago as 1764 the Italian writer Beccaria discovered that

> Crimes are more surely prevented by the certainty than by the severity of punishment....In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds

of men...grow hardened and insensible, and in the course of a hundred years, the *Wheel* terrifies no more than formerly the prisons.

But we need not fear a return to the days when, as in England at the beginning of the 19th century, 200 offences were punished by legal hangings!

What lines then must we follow? For in this matter no one remedy is likely to be found. Paradoxically we may say that *the best way to treat prisoners is not to make them.* There is a dislocation made in the life of a man or woman who is sent to prison, which later makes it harder for them to carry on with ordinary life; more difficult to get work; a little easier to take to criminal ways; a barrier has been put between them and their law-abiding friends and neighbours. This is of course not true of every prisoner. In all countries there are people who have broken the law and gone to prison from motives which their companions respect and admire; and, at the other end of the scale, unfortunately, there are social groups in every country where crime is accepted without condemnation as a normal activity; these are parasitic groups at war with the community on which they prey. In them no one loses the friendship of his mates for having "served time." He returns easily to the old criminal life. But for most of the people it is desirable that offences, which are neither of a very grave character nor entirely habitual, that are describable simply as lapses from a decent respect for other people's rights, should be dealt with by some other means than imprisonment.

Most Western societies have too much neglected the primitive and logical method of restitution. Also amongst other means probation stands pre-eminent since it is actively remedial. Fines are purely deterrent. In some countries a system of labour on public works, the offender living in his own home and paying for his offence by a fixed time of employment, affords a half-way house to imprisonment. But all these lie outside the subject of this paper.

When we come to consider methods of treating prisoners we face a fundamental question on which opinion is still changing, and has already changed more than is realized. Should sentences depend on the nature of the offence or on that of the offender? In some legal systems even today the Court has little power to adjust the sentence when once the accused has been pronounced guilty, whilst other systems give great latitude as to the penalty imposed. Some, again, make use of indeterminate sentences which allow of adjustment to the particular case in the actual course of imprisonment. Moreover, either the Court or the prison authorities have, in most countries, the power to decide which type of prison a man or woman shall be sent to. And this decision must make an incalculable difference in the weight of the penalty

to be suffered. For example, a year spent in such an open prison as I have described would be much less distressing than the same length of time passed in the sordid monotony of an ordinary local prison.

But is not this sort of discrimination a sin against Justice? For ages the world has debated: "What *is* justice?" and the argument will go on. But this we may say without fear of error, the justice of the Court and the prison, at its very best, is but a dim, distorted image of that austere and noble virtue which perhaps only good men even desire. Perfect justice would have to take into account a thousand things which cannot be known, even after the best of investigations. You stand, as it were, beside a stream in its lower courses; who can tell what sticks or stones or hoof-marks of fording beasts miles away caused its ripples? A man stands in the dock; no one knows, not even he himself, what faulty inheritance, what stabs and blows of fate, have made him the unlovely thing he is. A casual begetting, unwanted in childhood, an indifferent mother or none, the injustice of a teacher, uncongenial work, unemployment, a loved woman who tired of and left him—how can a law court assess the possible odds that have been against him? The judge may well have to say: "This is a dangerous man," and act accordingly; to say: "This is a wicked man," is outside his duty. But the offender is still a child of the State he has offended against, and an unavoidable injury is done to both if his treatment renders it unnecessarily hard for him to make good. The more dangerous prisoners cannot be given at once the treatment of the open prison, but a real injustice is done if the *régime* of the closed prison is allowed to be definitely unfavourable to reform. Differences in the circumstances for different prisoners should be dictated by their characters and considerations of public safety and not by the desire to punish.

It would be insincere to pretend that even with prisons from which all deteriorating factors were banished, in which a comprehension of each man's needs was directing his training, there would not still be many failures. For, more and more it becomes clear that a large proportion of these failures will be due to disturbances or malformations of character which are typical of what an English authority has named "the non-sane non-insane." Whilst it has long been accepted that the "criminal lunatic" (to use a paradoxical description now banished from English law) must be treated as a sick man rather than as a guilty one, the most thorny question regarding the treatment of prisoners is concerned with these difficult, at least partially irresponsible and sometimes supremely dangerous, persons. Their position legally and medically is uncertain and a constant problem.

Most countries would hesitate to extend their definition of certifiable

insanity so widely as to send to mental hospitals all the queer varieties, dull or brilliant, saints or sinners, lovable or detestable, who are "not quite like other people," for the sake of controlling the minority of law-breakers amongst them. Such a measure would be wasteful and cruel, and would impoverish the life of the community. Yet, though failing some special definition of the type and some better understanding of its treatment, we shall continue to see its criminal members receiving a succession of prison sentences for more or less grave offences which are an expense, an annoyance, and sometimes a cruel danger to the rest of the community. Experiments are being made. Some countries have established prison-hospitals for psychopathic and other mentally abnormal prisoners. It seems that every country should have at least one such institution, if only because the presence of this type of offender interferes with the treatment of the more normal men and women. But it must be acknowledged that even with such special attention the number of cures is not very encouraging. Perhaps the best we can as yet hope for is that these unfortunate ones should be segregated with as little suffering to themselves as possible and under circumstances favourable to their cure, which should never be despaired of. Modern methods of diagnosis and the new methods of treatment which are being tried may increase the possibilities of cure. But for long this group of offenders will offer the gravest problem. Its magnitude can be judged from a recent medical report to a British Government Committee expressing the opinion that 10 per cent of the men serving sentences in our country are in some degree mentally abnormal, and at least 5 per cent "should be accepted as medical responsibilities."

What makes the treatment of this "non-sane non-insane" type of prisoner so socially important is the high ratio of crimes of violence amongst their offences. Of the first 300 such men sent to the Danish hospital-prison, no less than 96 had been convicted of sexual offences against children, 24 of incendiarism, 19 of exhibitionism, 17 of robbery, violence or homicide, and 12 of rape. Till modern times people of this type were simply punished. The deterrent effect of punishment, however, is in general over-rated and in most cases it cannot have effected much but the strengthening of an anti-social attitude by arousing feelings of antagonism and revenge.

The general pattern for the treatment of prisoners which enlightened countries are now setting before themselves is, for those who can respond to it, a treatment based upon useful, positive training, a strengthening of the sense of responsibility, and a new outlook on life; and for the mentally sick, restraint from opportunities for crime coupled with skilled medical treatment. Neither of these modes of handling men and women can be applied to the mass

of prisoners sentenced for short terms for minor offences. Every effort should be made to save such people from the hardening, wasteful contamination of prison. If they are imprisoned the authorities must arrange to prevent their being degraded by the *régime*. The much-quoted dictum : " Offenders are sent to prison *as* a punishment, not *for* punishment," must be borne in mind. A constant prison population of minor offenders is a useless expense to any country.

One must admit that most, if not all, penal systems lag far behind the ideal. But it is well for all of us who are hoping for progress to note the successful efforts which are being made today in so many quarters of the globe.

MARGERY FRY

RURALIZATION AND SCIENCE

The fallacy, so widespread in India, that ruralization and decentralization of economic production and political power are in some sense opposed to science and rationalism is critically discussed by "Gora," the author of *An Atheist with Gandhi* in the December 1953 issue of *The Indian Rationalist*.

Science has been a great help to civilization. But the weakness of science lies in its failure to supply the needs for proper social living.

The failure on the part of scientists, just as in the case of artists too, to be alive to their social responsibilities is making the progress of science a menace to civilization rather than an advantage.

The danger of large-scale industries lies in their tendency to press individuals into fixed technical categories.

The development of such a tendency... will again stifle the freedom of the individual, giving rise to the dictatorship of the managerial type now, if not of the cultural and of the economic types characteristic of the caste-system of older days.

Human society ought to be an association of free individuals. A necessary groundwork for such a society is the decentralization of economic production and political power. The scientific development of cottage industries (including the production of *khadi*) should put an end to the exploitation of labour by big industrialists and finally lead to a formation of society based upon decentralization.

The danger of cottage industries lies in the revival of the old caste-system, but this can be prevented by the cultivation of the scientific outlook, the spread of literacy and more liberal social customs.

A. P.

REVELATION AND REASON IN ISLAM

[One of the most interesting points made in this study by **Dr. Erwin I. J. Rosenthal** of Cambridge University is how Muslim philosophers found a way to blend the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with their revealed prophetic law, becoming the transmitters of the classical tradition that flowered again in the Renaissance. That in mediæval Europe, though theologians might be at loggerheads, Jewish, Christian and Muslim philosophers could find a meeting ground in a true humanism seems hopeful for a wider future *rapprochement* upon the basis of the different religions' common core of Truth.—ED.]

In the seventh and eighth centuries the Arabs conquered vast empires for Islam, the submission to the will of Allah made known by his messenger Muhammad, "the seal of the prophets." Islam as a way of life survived the vicissitudes of power politics and the schism into orthodox Sunnite and heterodox Shi'ite parts. In this it succeeded mainly because its simple tenets could easily be blended with the characteristic features of the varying civilizations which flourished under the religious-political domination of the Caliphs. By the ninth century a specifically Islamic civilization had been firmly established which accepted and met the challenge of its religious and spiritual rivals. Though Muslim theologians owe much to Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, and though Indian influence on Sufism is manifest, it is the Muslim stand on the revelation of the "Precious Book," the *Qur'an*, which determined the battle of minds and ended with the victory of Islam.

This has an important bearing on the central problem of the Middle Ages that faced Judaism, Christianity and Islam alike: the problem of Revelation and Reason. In Islam, as in Judaism, it took the form of the challenge of Greek-Hellenistic philosophy to revealed prophetic law. The absolute truth of Revelation stands, from the beginning, towering over the philosophers of Islam; it determines their speculation; it circumscribes the scope of their rational inquiry. But it does not simply take the place of a premise in philosophy, as a postulate of human reason; nay, coming from God, it takes precedence over everything and is binding on every Muslim. Besides, the character of Revelation as prophetic law excludes not only any subjectivity inherent in a communication between the Divine and the human; it demands the complete submission of the human will and mind to its commandments, both theoretical and practical. In other words, this Law prescribes man's thought and action. It teaches the truth about God and all existing things in a perfection which no human being can ever attain by independent reasoning.

In Islam this law is the outcome of three sources all connected with Muhammad who, as "the seal of the prophets," received from God the final, definitive revelation. The *Qur'an* contains this final manifestation of God's will and purpose with his creation. This is the first and foremost source of knowledge and guide for life. The second is the *Sunna* of the prophet, his life as the founder of the Muslim community and its first chief. *Hadith*, a body of traditions all going back, or rather being traced, to Muhammad and giving spiritual and moral guidance to his community, is the third source.

All three are worked into the *Shari'a*, the revealed prophetic law. This law binds all Muslims, the elect few outstanding intellects no less than the masses of believers. The *Qur'an* as the heavenly book is the proof of revelation. Its existence is not subject to the philosopher's proof. It is real and true and infallible. Sovereignty and authority thus belong to God and his Law in Islam, and not to Reason as in Greek philosophy. Therefore, philosophy in Islam is essentially religious philosophy and as such hardly distinguishable from theology. For this theology is largely conditioned by the reception and adaptation of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, of Plato and Aristotle, and of their successors and commentators, especially Plotinus, whose *Enneads* IV-VI in an abridged form were supposed to be Aristotle's *Theology*. The opposition of the orthodox theologians of Islam against Aristotle does not really contradict this claim, the more so since the school of Al-Ash'ari in its fight against the rationalist Mu'tazilites, had to admit Reason as a legitimate source of religious knowledge. Needless to say, theologians, in contrast to the Muslim philosophers, would not accept Aristotle's concept of the eternity of matter since it would detract from God's power to create the world out of nothing. But Aristotle's logic, physics and metaphysics presented such a powerful challenge to the truth of revelation and, consequently to Islam itself, that rational interpretation of the *Qur'an* had to be conceded.

There was, however, profound disagreement between the orthodox theologians and the philosophers concerning the scope of rational inquiry, the range of application of a figurative or allegorical interpretation of the Word of God. Nor would the orthodox theologians ever admit the intention of philosophy to be identical with that of revealed prophetic law, as Averroes maintains, any more than his other claim that the philosopher alone was entitled to the authoritative interpretation of Revelation with the help of demonstrative proof. Averroes' fight against the *mutakallimun*, the dialectic theologians, is the final act in the struggle between orthodoxy and philosophers. To contest the authority and ability of the official theologians demanded a mind of the calibre of that of Averroes. But

where he succeeded, thanks to his undoubted Muslim orthodoxy, lesser minds were bound to fail; and the last quarter of the 12th century witnessed in the Muslim West the passing of an independent philosophy with Averroes' death.

But we have anticipated a development which we have yet to describe, at least briefly. For Averroes not only completed the work of his predecessors among the Muslim philosophers, the *falasifa*; he differs in some important respects from them.

To understand fully the problem of Revelation and Reason in Islam, we must remember that the challenge to the truth of revelation first came from religious minds who were perturbed by the teachings of Aristotle. To vindicate the truth of "Scripture" was an urgent necessity, not only to reassure their own minds and to strengthen and maintain their own faith, but also to save Islam itself from the doubters and scoffers. Unlike the earlier Jewish-Muslim and particularly Christian-Muslim controversies, this attack came from within. It was the more dangerous because the Mu'tazilites were not concerned with the alleged inferiority of Islam as a religion compared to Christianity, but with the crudity of the dominant literal interpretation of the nature and essence of God and of Muslim articles of faith compared with the lofty rational explanations of Aristotle concerning God and the universe. Hence their concept of a twofold meaning of the *Qur'an*; an external, literal and an internal, figurative one, and their device of figurative interpretation. There is only one truth. If Scripture be true—and this was an article of faith with them—it must not run counter to Reason, even though they could not agree with Aristotle. For their aim was not a reconciliation with Aristotle, but a defence of Revelation against him with the help of rational argument.

The *falasifa* from Al-Kindi and Alfarabi to Avicenna and Averroes attempted a reconciliation between Revelation and Philosophy. Both taught one and the same truth, but in two different ways. Religion speaks in metaphors and parables, accessible to the masses of believers. Philosophy teaches truth by demonstrative proof accessible only to the metaphysician who has studied Logic, Physics, Psychology and Metaphysics, as taught by Aristotle and explained by his commentators, of whom the most important tried to harmonize Aristotle with his teacher Plato. The elect few alone are capable of attaining Truth in reality. The masses must be satisfied with an approximation of it, like a reflection in a mirror. None of them doubted, much less denied the validity of Revelation, or that it contained the truth, albeit veiled.

An exception must be made for Averroes who alone staked a claim for the metaphysician as the sole legitimate authority to interpret the truth of revelation. He did so for

two reasons. First, he opposed the dialectic theologians because they relied on rhetoric and persuasion, being capable of dialectical arguments only. For that reason they were a danger to the security and purity of Islam: they gave out interpretations which, lacking demonstrative proof, were uncertain and often wrong and therefore bound to confuse the masses and lead them into error. Averroes shared his insistence on demonstrative proof with the *falasifa*. Secondly, and principally, he stressed the superiority of Revelation, as his contemporary Maimonides did among the Jews and St. Thomas Aquinas among the Christians. He did so because he defined Revelation as revealed prophetic law. Such a law is superior to the man-made law of the philosopher, the *Nomos* of Plato and Aristotle, inasmuch as God is superior to man, his creature.

It is significant that the Jew Philo of Alexandria (first century of the Christian Era) already drew this distinction between revealed and human law and accorded precedence and perfection to the former. Like Philo and Maimonides, Averroes saw the characteristic and only relevant feature of prophecy in the existence of a Divine Law. For him, Divine Law is the essence of Revelation, and it is for this reason that prophetic law is superior to the Greek law. This prophetic law teaches right beliefs about God, the angels, Providence, reward and punishment in the hereafter, and lays down precise rules about the relationship between God and man, and between man and man. It thus goes far beyond the human law. What it has in common with the man-made law is free from error and imperfection because it comes from God. Moreover, this Law commands man endowed with reason, to aspire to a knowledge of God and existing things.

To grasp fully what the law itself teaches about God requires interpretation with the aid of demonstrative proof. But, Averroes avers, human reason is not infallible, wherefore certain statements in the religious law must not be interpreted, even by the trained philosopher: they must be accepted in their literal sense as articles of faith. The philosopher alone can and must interpret what needs interpretation, he alone is entitled to search for the hidden, inner meaning whereas the masses must be content with the plain, literal meaning. But since he uses demonstrative—as opposed to dialectical—argument he cannot fall into error or lead others into error, forbidden as he is to divulge the esoteric meaning to the masses incapable of understanding it. Nor can there be any contradiction between Revelation and Reason in matters that are accessible to human reason.

Averroes has stated more emphatically and unambiguously than any of his predecessors the limitations of human reason and the excellence of the revealed prophetic law which he considered ideal for the ideal state

such as Plato conceived in his *Republic*. In theory, the Islamic State *is* the Ideal State, based on the *Shari'a*. The Greek State and its law aim at the happiness of the few elect philosophers only.

The *falasifa* betray the influence of Greek political philosophy in postulating happiness as the aim of the *Shari'a*. Averroes bridges the gulf which separates the masses from the elect intellectually, by letting both share in the happiness the revealed law grants to all believers.

The solution of the problem of Revelation and Reason worked out in Islam, especially by Averroes, has its parallels in Judaism and in Christianity. This is due in the first place to a unity of outlook which is common to all three religions in the mediæval world, in spite of their very real differences. This unity is inspired by their monotheistic faith tempered with reason, as taught by Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Theirs was an intelligent faith which embraced all manifestations of moral and intellectual life. The cruelty of the Inquisition and the intolerance of theologians and rulers must not blind us to the reality of a true humanism which provided the common ground for the religious philosophers of all three faiths in the West.

Muslim philosophers evolved this fruitful blend of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with the revealed prophetic law of Islam; they gave the Highest Good of the philosophers a religious interpretation and brought it within reach of every Muslim, irrespective of his intellectual attainment but dependent upon his moral integrity. This is mediæval Islam's challenging legacy to Christendom, largely through the mediation of Judaism. Such a religious-ethical humanism, with its respect for the individual person in its striving for the Highest Good, is also the hope of mankind today.

ERWIN I. J. ROSENTHAL

ABORIGINES

In a land where over 19 million of the population are aborigines, a survey of these people brought out in a special number of *The March of India* (November-December, 1953) with varied presentations by eminent anthropologists and others, is meritorious. There are numerous pictures and statistical data giving this issue added appeal. The contributions deal with art, administration, social customs, dietaries, myths, etc. In his article, B. S. Guha, a noted anthropologist, observes that :—

> Instead of taking a supercilious attitude there is a great deal that we can learn from them (the aborigines) regarding a healthy and emotionally adjusted life, and honesty of thought and action.

An attitude of goodwill and sympathetic understanding towards the tribal peoples is expressed throughout the publication.

The Government of India should be congratulated for this timely service and for promoting interest amongst scholars in anthropological studies. It is also a service to the many aboriginal tribes who cannot speak for themselves to the other millions of India.

EDUCATING THE WEST TO APPRECIATE THE EAST

[**Mr. Bruce Findlow** is a Unitarian now working at the Kharang Rural Centre of Miss Margaret Barr. He has lived for some time in Japan and is planning to go to Manchester College, Oxford, for theological training. He writes verse and is a pacifist. In this article he suggests methods of bringing the East and the West really closer in mind and heart.—ED.]

If this question has any relevance at this point in time the fact must imply that the West does not appreciate the East yet—or appreciate it sufficiently. Both are still reasonable assumptions to make although they cannot be made as confidently now as they could have been 50 or even 25 years ago. Today more people in the West know something of the East than ever before—knowledge is the pre-requisite of appreciation but not necessarily the cause —but it is still true that among the generality of Westerners the East is but vaguely known and faintly appreciated.

Any thought about changing this state of affairs begets two, perhaps three, immediate questions. Who is to do the educating? How is it to be done? And some would ask also: Where is it to be done? The answer to the first of these seems to be that, initially at least, the East must take the lead and hope to find helpers in the West with the passage of time. This answer in turn produces two more questions on which a great deal depends. Does the East want to be appreciated on the other side of the world? What aspects of its life and culture does it think merit appreciation? Listening to individual voices one is soon assured that the answer to the first question is in the affirmative but perhaps it is the very lack of unanimity in the answers to the second which prevents the wishes from becoming deeds.

Currently it is fashionable in most parts of the East to admire the technological attainments of the West, to follow the West in methods of production and business and to exalt the notions of speed and newness which go with these aspects of western life. As a result, there are some in the cities of the East who seek the admiration of the West for the way they have mastered its techniques and established a reasonable facsimile of the industrial West under an eastern sky. If the East decides to seek appreciation along this path it will be a long, hard road indeed and, even if mutual respect is achieved, it will be of no particular value to either East or West. It will encourage the West in its vices by giving them the appearance of virtues! Fortunately there is a larger school of thought

which, while taking something from the West finds much in eastern life worth keeping and worth appreciating. It is symbolized by the Japanese businessman who goes home from a modern streamlined office to change from western clothes into a kimono and sit on the *tatami* of his entirely Japanese home for his evening leisure.

The Westerner who spends some time in the East and surveys it with a reasonably open mind usually finds much to admire, much that is superior to its equivalent in the West or at least adds something to that ; but these "areas of appreciation" invariably relate to the intangibles rather than to the solid material things of life and this undoubtedly makes it harder for the East to win a wider circle of appreciation in the West. At the same time this fact, taken together with the present extensive introduction of western ideas and methods into the East, makes the task more urgent. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that, if the present one-way flow of appreciation continues, the East may lose (or lose its own appreciation of) some of the most valuable elements of its life before the West has had time to " find them good."

In the fields of religion, philosophy and the arts—to name only three—the East has much to teach the West, much that the West should not only appreciate but also needs to learn and implement in its own life to offset the ill effects on human individuals of high-speed industrial life in big cities. For if the individual in the East often seems to be in danger of starvation, misery or death because of population pressure and low living standards his brother in the West is no less in danger of losing his sanity and his soul in his passion to possess and his craze for the new. When the matter is seen in this light it becomes the positive duty of the East to make its virtues better known to the West. The East still enshrines in its way of life and in its thought values which the West has almost forgotten, certainly " de-valued, " but which it must eventually reclaim.

During the last 10 years or so the countries of the East have been persuaded that they are materially backward and in need of the help of the West. This has resulted in a flow of Easterners to the West ; undergraduates, graduates, technicians, farmers, politicians and others have gone to the West to acquire knowledge and some admiration for the elements of western life which will help them to improve the material condition of their own countries. At the same time there has been some movement of materials and technical experts in the opposite direction. This condition of affairs suggests an answer to the question of how to educate the West to appreciate the East and, incidentally, says something about the question of where to do it.

Can the East persuade the West that it is, say, spiritually backward and must seek its salvation in the

East? There are already many people in the West who would agree that there is a spiritual slump in their world but most of them, if searching for a comparison, would look to their own past rather than to another part of the contemporary world. But there are also some in the West who, having studied or lived in or visited the East, have discovered that, in so far as the deepest things of life are concerned, they are but learners in the East, no matter what their attainments are in the West. These people are already convinced that, in part at least, they must seek their personal salvation in the East. This fact points to the second stage of the answer to the question "How?" This, too, parallels what is already happening in the opposite direction in other spheres of life. Somehow, East and West must bring into being a larger and more continuous flow than there has been so far of people, young people in particular, from West to East to see and learn at first hand. In this case, it is not those concerned with the material needs of life who must journey abroad but men of religion, philosophers, psychologists, writers and artists and others who are working in the areas of western life which can be revitalized by a greater knowledge and appreciation of the rich heritage of the East.

This is no simple matter to be achieved overnight. On a mundane level, modern communications have reduced the barriers of space and time between West and East but the cost barrier remains to daunt all but a few. At another level, a variety of prejudices and myths which discourage travel from West to East must be dissolved. Again, somehow there must be born in the West the view that, for a percentage of the population, travel and study in the East is a necessary part of education. And, by no means least, the West will have to be gently persuaded that it is just not good enough to study the East in the languages of the West. This matter of language suggests at least one way in which the East can work in the West to secure greater appreciation and pave the way for this eastward flow. In Australia's oldest university at the present time an undergraduate wanting to study languages can choose from Latin, Greek, French, German, Italian, Hebrew and possibly Arabic. A few years ago he could also tackle Chinese or Japanese if he wished but first Chinese was dropped and, at the end of 1952, Japanese also ceased to be taught. The reason seems to have been a combination of shortage of funds plus the academic affection of Australia for the languages of the rather remote West. The study of eastern history is in only a slightly better state and yet Australia is surrounded by the countries of the East. If eastern governments and interested parties would give more tangible encouragement to the study of their languages in the West there would be no lack of western students eager to discover, through language, eastern

literature and thought.

If and when it becomes possible for more students from the West to visit the East for study—perhaps at the East's expense—a test of language might well be the best way of finding the right candidates. For some years yet it will be safe to assume that the western student who chooses to try to learn Chinese or Japanese or Hindi in preference to French or German or Italian is already an enthusiast for things eastern and certain to profit by study at first hand. The possibility of such an opportunity would itself encourage more students to turn to eastern languages. And, when the student arrives in the East, let his life and studies be among people rather than things, the usual rather than the odd, the present rather than the past. The West needs more people with a broad human knowledge of the East quite as much as it needs the special studies of historians, anthropologists and students of comparative religion. And it is the former rather than the latter who can diffuse appreciation of the East over a wide area in the West.

Already in the West there are various individuals and organizations that help to create interest in and appreciation of the East. But it is not good for the East to rely too much on such activities, because western organizations and people do not always possess the authority which will secure wide acceptance of their statements. Similarly, it is not wise to assume that people from the East who are studying in the West will automatically do much to make Westerners admire the East. These students and travellers, because they are in the West, conform to western ways of life to some degree (and some are eager to do so) and the Westerner is far more interested in seeing how well or how badly the visitor can fit in than in trying to imagine what the same person is like at home. Moreover, lazy people in the West are inclined to claim that they can learn all they need to know of the East from visiting students to relieve themselves of any responsibility of seeking knowledge by more arduous paths. But any contact between East and West on a peaceful basis is of value (not least the contact by the written word through magazines with an international circulation) and the central line of argument here is not meant to deride such contact in any way.

Finally, with our particular need of them almost at an end, something should be said about these general terms "East" and "West." In the West we have become so accustomed to casting all the nations of Asia into a single lump called "the East" that it came as something of a shock to at least one Westerner to hear a student from Thailand describe his varied personal attitudes to people of other Asian countries. It is by no means unusual for an ordinary citizen in the West to proceed from the actions of, say, a single Japanese, to a condemnation not only of all Japanese

but of all Asians! In the East also, the western visitor sometimes finds himself suffering for the sins of some other visitor with whom he has nothing in common except perhaps blue eyes! The general terms are convenient but it will be a step in the right direction when we discard them; ceasing to think of a world of two parts and applying our appreciative feelings first to races and ultimately letting them flow back and forth in the warmer air of individual human relations. Educating an Englishman to appreciate a Japanese or a Frenchman to appreciate an Indian sounds both more congenial and more capable of realization and carries its own message of individual responsibility.

BRUCE FINDLOW

WORLD PHILOSOPHY

Prof. Satis Chandra Chatterjee, in his presidential address before the 1953 Baroda Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, "The Basis of World Philosophy," suggested lines of approach to the reconciliation of Eastern and Western thought. Western philosophy was interested in the study of the external world, Indian metaphysics, in seeking within for the reality of the world and of the individual. Experience and reason were relied on by Western philosophy; the Indian stressed the place in philosophy of spiritual experience or intuition, though it was not the whole of philosophy. Whereas each Western metaphysical system claimed to be the whole truth regarding reality, Eastern philosophers accorded to each system a particular order of validity. Some Eastern concepts were paralleled in Western philosophy, but not the impersonal absolute of Advaita Vedanta.

Professor Chatterjee suggested for bridging the gulf the recognition that Reality was many-sided and Truth manifold, that alternative standpoints resulted in different philosophical systems and that the physical world is one of several orders of reality, others being waking; dreaming; deep, dreamless sleep; and the transcendental experience of *turiya*. He proposes Indian philosophy's developing the "philosophy of the absolute as a dynamic, living reality manifested in the world of matter, life and mind," as set forth by Sri Aurobindo and Dr. Radhakrishnan, and the extension of Western philosophy to the study of the spiritual world.

Professor Chatterjee would have more study in East and West of the *samskaras*, traits unaccounted for by heredity or environment, ascribed by many Indian philosophers to prior births. He calls for clarifying the law of Karma and such empirical study of it as is possible. Ethical thinkers everywhere could profit from the recommended "psychological study and philosophical justification of the ideal of self-realization through disinterested action" and from accepting *ahimsa* as a cardinal virtue.

E. M. H.

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

[In this article **Shri Janki Nath Bhat**, M.A., Lecturer in History at the University of Mysore, points out clearly why India decided to retain her membership in the Commonwealth and the good that has resulted from the special status given to the Republic of India.—ED.]

In 1947 when the partition of the Indian sub-continent into two dominions: India and Pakistan, was made it was believed by many that India would definitely break away from Britain and the Commonwealth. But strangely enough, every year since then has seen her more and more closely wedded to the Commonwealth countries in spite of the fundamental differences she has with some of them, like South Africa. The change in India's attitude after winning independence becomes less surprising if one keeps in mind the history of the policy of the Indian National Congress, the ruling party now and the predominant political force before independence. The Congress, for a time, had been asking Britain for Dominion Status for India. Unfortunately the reluctance of the British Government to grant it, the long time it took to part with power and its repressive measures, made the Congress leaders very bitter. A resolution was passed by the All-India Congress Committee in 1929 which was solely directed towards "*Purṇa Swarāj*," complete independence, and which envisaged no link with the Commonwealth. But even then, under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress was prepared to accept Dominion Status. In 1931, while addressing the second session of the Round Table Conference, Mahatma Gandhi said:—

> I have aspired—I still aspire—to be a citizen, not in an Empire, but in a Commonwealth; in a partnership if possible...but not a partnership superimposed upon one nation by another. Hence you find here that the Congress claims that either party should have the right to sever the connexion, to dissolve the partnership.[1]

This was later followed, however, by a period of opposition to even Dominion Status by the Congress. On December 13th, 1946, Pandit Nehru moved a resolution in the Indian Constituent Assembly which stated that the Constituent Assembly declared its firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an independent sovereign Republic. After independence it became, therefore, uncertain as to whether she would or would not continue to be a member of the Commonwealth.

In April 1949, the Prime Ministers of all the Dominions held a Conference at London to decide the position of India which was about to declare herself a Republic. At the Conference India made her posi-

[1] R. COPELAND, *The Indian Problem: 1833-1935*, (p. 126).

tion clear. First, she was firmly resolved to have a Republican Constitution. Secondly, and this was what was rather unexpected, she desired to retain her association with the other nations of the British Commonwealth.

It would be interesting to discuss here the considerations which must have caused India to somewhat unexpectedly express the wish to retain membership in the Commonwealth. There were both advantages and disadvantages involved. The disadvantages being, perhaps, more obvious than the advantages. First of all, it was commonly believed at that time that membership in the Commonwealth would entail a curtailment of sovereignty, in spite of the Balfour declaration which acknowledged the complete independence of the Dominions. Second, it seemed to be going against the definitely declared "neutral" Foreign Policy of India, for it was assumed that the link with the British Commonwealth would mean India's leaning towards the Anglo-American bloc. Third, Britain was still a colonial power, and such connection would imply a countenancing of her colonial control over Malaya and other colonies, at a time when most of these were looking to India for leadership. Fourth, Britain's racial policy in South Africa and her discrimination against South Africans of Indian origin had been a sore point since the time Gandhiji had led his non-violent movement against the South African Government. Finally, considering the bitter relations between India and Pakistan and Britain's chilly attitude towards India in Kashmir (for this was the time when the British delegation in the UNO did much to side-track the complaint of India against Pakistan for the latter's complicity with the raiders in Kashmir), was not encouraging. Added to all this, Mr. Churchill's open partiality for Pakistan and his vehement speeches in the House of Commons in favour of British intervention in Hyderabad, after having asserted that he had "not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire," did a great deal towards making the position of the Indian leaders very difficult.

On the other hand there were many advantages which the people in India, who were strongly decrying membership in the Commonwealth, were apt to overlook. India was dependent, to a great extent, on British personnel in the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force. Britain was then, as it is now, the chief country with which India had foreign trade. Also Britain's war debt to India tended to tie India to the sterling bloc; and British shipping, banking, marine insurance, and investments were important factors in Indian economic life. Above all, India was afraid that severing her relations with the Commonwealth would enhance the economic position of Pakistan with Britain to the detriment of India.

The feeling of some that associa-

tion in the Commonwealth would mean curtailment of sovereignty for India was dispelled by the reassuring statement that had been made by Britain in June 1947, that the Indian Constituent Assembly was free to decide whether India wanted to remain in the Commonwealth or leave it. And it was finally felt that, on the whole, the balance of advantage was on the side of India's continued membership in the Commonwealth.

It should not be forgotten that although Britain, for various reasons, was intent upon persuading India to continue membership, she had also to face an anxious time. It was not without hesitation that she agreed to the special status given to India in the Commonwealth. Commenting on this *The New Statesman and Nation*, (April 23, 1949), asserted that there were two difficulties likely to be created by the decision :—

The first is that of stretching an already tenuous constitution until it dissipated itself into thin air. The second is that of creating a special status for India which might lead first to a special status for Pakistan and Ceylon, and then to a special status for South Africa, until finally the Commonwealth was nothing but a congeries of special cases.

This opinion was shared by a number of people in England, and, among the members of the Commonwealth, Australia was not particularly well disposed towards the new arrangement. But, on the whole, the decision was approved by most of those concerned. It received strong support from one most unexpected source, Mr. Churchill, who commenting on the decision said :—

I feel that the tides of the world are favourable to our voyage. The pressure of dangers and duties that are shared in common by all of us in these days may well make new harmonies in India and, indeed, with large parts of Asia. We may also see coming into view an even larger synthesis of states and nations.[2]

Time has proved, we think, that the special status given to India has made the Commonwealth all the stronger ; and India has been realizing how wise it was not to break her connection with it, even in the face of great provocation from within and without. The great message of Smuts—that grand old man of South Africa—is growing clearer with the passage of time. He is reported to have said that the Commonwealth's contribution of human qualities: such as balance, moderation, good sense, good humour and fair-play is of a very special character. They are worth more than scores of divisions.

JANKI NATH BHAT

[2] *New Lanka*, Vol. III, No. 2, p. 14 : "Commonwealth Unity."

THE WAY OF THE CYNICS

[This short article has a message—not especially and only for the India of today, influenced by the pleasure-loving West, but for the world as a whole surfeited with the attractions of hedonism. **Shri S. K. Ramachandra Rao** of the Institute of Science at Bangalore has done well to point to the message of frugal living which stresses the importance of *ponos*, *tapas*, the polishing and mellowing of mind by *abhyasa* and *vairagya*—Practice and Detachment.—ED.]

The emphasis on virtue as an essential ingredient of human happiness is universal, but the fact that simplicity is a form of virtue is not so unreservedly accepted. Nations differ on this point. India, for instance, has for ages adhered to the doctrine that simplicity is the equivalent of godliness. In the West, however, philosophy generally is regarded as more intellectual than practical or humane; and apparently simplicity signifies little except in academic ethical discussions. The western zeal for a "richer, fuller life" is usually traced to the vigorous worldly philosophy of the later, pleasure-loving Greeks, who were the intellectual forerunners of western civilization. The Greeks were, no doubt, prosperous in most respects and looked on life with a gay smile of irrepressible optimism. But they were certainly not oblivious of the part of simplicity in conducing to happiness: Socrates himself was a classical example of frugality; and it is interesting to note that one of his followers, Antisthenes, lead a band of enthusiasts inspired by his life and teachings who pursued a simplicity which verged on asceticism. Although they were never very popular, being regarded at first, perhaps, as queer and eccentric specimens who never completely succeeded in their mission, their ideals have guided for centuries the footsteps of many an earnest human being.

The Grecian devotees of the simple life were called Cynics, possibly connoting their admiration for the mode of life of the dog in contrast to that of pleasure-loving and self-indulgent men. In dogs, it is said, they perceived four great virtues: indifference as to their way of life, absolute disregard for public opinion, guarding the person and property of whoever trusts them and discrimination between friends and foes. These Cynic philosophers, with a strange fortitude, resolved to emulate these virtues: pleased with whatever might come their way, going about barefoot, eating and making love in public, wandering about at all seasons of the year with the barest minimum of garments, eschewing shame and dignity, regardless of censure or praise and guarding the tenets of their philosophy with unswerving fidelity. Contentment and cool equanimity were their watchwords. The perversities

of fortune never perplexed them, for they never sought fortune. Suffering and privation they endured without a murmur and even gladly welcomed them for the schooling they gave in the hard ascetic discipline. They are said to have admired in Socrates the spirit of endurance, in Diogenes the spirit of utter indifference, in Crates continence and in Zeno hardihood. Heracles with his courage and vitality, endurance and adventure, was their hero.

This Cynic philosophy was made popular by Diogenes of Sinope, whom Plato described as "Socrates gone mad." He was in fact a pupil of Antisthenes, who was the pupil of Socrates. Diogenes, in acknowledging inspiration from Socrates, singled out mainly the master's simplicity of life and made that the dogma of his school. His rule of life was asceticism; his gospel was to shed the artificialities of convention, tradition, fashion and passion from human life so as to make it more natural. After all, life belongs to nature and therefore should be lived according to nature. He cursed politics, admired liberty, and proclaimed himself a "citizen of the world." His mission in life was to alter the current modes of living by instituting the practice of virtue in place of pleasure-seeking in the scheme of men's lives. Crates was the most famous of his disciples. He was heir to great wealth but gave it up in preference for a Cynic's simple life. "Like Heracles," he declared, "I march and fight against lusts.... I am the deliverer of mankind and healer of men's woes." Plutarch tells us that Crates "passed his whole life jesting and laughing, as though on a perpetual holiday." Crates characterized himself as a scout of God, a schoolmaster of humanity, a citizen of the lands of obscurity and poverty, impregnable to fortune, perfectly free and therefore absolutely happy.

A pupil of Crates was Zeno, celebrated for his riddles. As a Stoic he furthered the Cynic philosophy and propounded its ethical doctrine by the Socratic method. He defined the end of human life as "life in accordance with nature," which is tantamount to saying life in accordance with virtue, *i.e.*, with frugality, continence, simplicity and endurance. He used logic to show how the Cynic ideals agreed with macrocosmic principles. Ariston, also a Cynic, differed from Zeno in that he stressed a life of "complete indifference to everything between virtue and vice"; he equated philosophy with ethics. Normally we find persons being trained, by themselves or by others, to play certain rôles and specialize in certain character-parts; but philosophy should train a person to enact well any rôle assigned to him. In other words, one should be a Cynic to occupy any station in life with equanimity and efficiency.

Cynicism, by emphasizing asceticism, tended to turn the enthusiast's mind away from worldly pursuits, and sometimes even from social and

civic obligations; it also instilled an aversion for the wealthy class. Diogenes was exiled and he relished this independence: it was he who coined the expression "*kosmopolites*" to denote world-citizenship. With this international outlook, indifference to the factors of social and communal solidarity, and contempt for conventions, the Cynics alienated the sympathy of the ruling class as well as that of the aristocrats. In due course, by the end of the third century, the movement had faded out, although its basic ideas were absorbed and assimilated by Stoicism.

In the following we find an elegant *apologia* for the benefits of virtue as set forth in Cynicism: Actual life is more important than intellectual adventures: it is the business of philosophy as of science, not to arrange our thoughts or develop talents, but to help us to lead happy lives. Men, in their folly, mistake pleasures for happiness. Pleasures (*hedone*) forge for us fetters and make us slaves of impulses and conventions; in the end grief is the outcome. Virtue, on the other hand, delivers us from sorrow and in this lies happiness. Virtue therefore should be our objective. The path of virtue is hard and demands self-restraint, discipline and the power of endurance. Unremitting *ponos*, roughly equivalent to the Sanskrit *tapas* (mortification), is an indispensable aid to virtue. *Ponos* and *hedone* are eternal opposites: most men choose the latter for it is easier to do so and it gives an immediate illusion of happiness; but wise men always choose the former for the satisfaction it gives is unshaken by vicissitudes. Mental equipoise must never be made to depend upon physical comforts, for, upon loss of the latter the former would be lost too. Men must learn to be independent and self-reliant. This requires practice, toil, and the will to achieve and in this virtue consists. Virtue is its own reward and sure happiness (*endaimonia*) radiates from it naturally.

All this reads like a chapter from Indian philosophy. What was but one minor school of thought in Greece has been our national genius. But the rising tide of the mundane ideology of our contemporary civilization appears to be enveloping Indian life and we stand close to the loss of our souls. The thought that from the robust, prosperous and pleasure-loving Greeks there arose a cry of discontent and a feeling of distrust for worldly abundance should be for us opportunely instructive. How would it profit us if we gained everything else and in the process lost ourselves?

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN NATIONAL LIFE

[**Shri Devabrata Sinha** of Calcutta University has made a very useful suggestion to modern India in this thought-provoking article.—ED.]

It was Karl Marx who declared: "Philosophers have interpreted the world in different ways, but the point is to change it." This fateful remark of Marx is a standing challenge to the world of philosophy. It is the philosopher who, in all ages, has taken the greatest liberty with the mind in constructing a total view of things and beings, and in judging their meaning and value. Thus, through its adventure in ideas, philosophy has enjoyed Olympian heights and revered appreciation. But, on the other hand, currents of criticism from without and within flow against it. The utility of philosophy in the concrete life of society has been questioned and radically challenged, as it is in the statement mentioned above.

For a basis, however, in our enquiry into the rôle of philosophy in the social life of a nation, we must ascertain the definite import of "philosophy." The same word seems to stand for divergent types of mental and spiritual activities, varying from mystical contemplation to the hard dialectical process of arguing. Let us not linger over the host of academic and semi-academic definitions. To put it very broadly, philosophy is the total interpretation of human experience. And, as such, it is a critical study of the fundamental principles of understanding. It is neither a collection of facts or a description of events, nor is it the airy flight of imagination or heavenly revelations!

So, one thing is certain: Philosophy is primarily an intellectual activity. The spirit of enquiry is deep in the recesses of man's nature. Man is obliged by the demand of his nature to think and reflect. Thus he seeks to understand the nature of the cosmos, the meaning of existence, the value of the human individual and the destiny of life. And this intellectual urge for truth finds its expression through the systematic enquiry which is the discipline known as philosophy.

But it is no wonder that such a study should tend to be abstract, if not vague, in spite of its universality and catholicity. It is this pre-eminently abstract character of the subject, added to by its subtle deliberations often ending in unfamiliar results, that has invited the chief criticism of its social value and efficacy.

Yet, with all its abstraction, philosophy inevitably finds a place in the scheme of human life. Man has realized, as Socrates declared long ago, that an unexamined life is not

worth living. Thus, we are driven to the consideration of values. Life is not all a summation of meaningless facts, but it is complete only with reference to a purpose and a whole. Philosophy is there to coordinate ends and thus to give a meaning to life by setting it in a perspective. The facts amassed by science through analytical methods require evaluation by philosophy.

Now, from all these considerations, it should be clear that the possibility of philosophy need not be disputed. What we need to examine is the value of philosophy for community life. It is true that so far as philosophy implies a way of looking at things—maybe, *sub specie æternitatis*—a certain attitude, it would find a place in society. But what puts philosophy to the test is the social reference. Two questions seem to arise in this connection: firstly, has philosophy been integrally connected to a social organization, and, secondly, what is the rôle that philosophy is likely to play or is expected to play within the scheme of a modern social organization or modern nation's life? The answer to the first question would go a long way towards meeting the second. For mankind can hardly be believed to have changed fundamentally in its essential behaviour; and, hence, a review of the past of mankind could certainly give us a clue towards estimating the order of things in the present as well as in the future.

To look at the question as to how far philosophy has been integrally—not incidentally or superficially—connected with a social organization: what strikes us at the outset is that it is pre-eminently a cultural pursuit. For a philosophy embodies the fundamental insights and inspirations of a people, their deeper faiths and their peculiar attitude towards life—all that goes to mark the peculiar genius of the group of human beings. This is, indeed, the larger sense of the term, which is: "the unseen foundation on which the structure of civilization rests," as Dr. Radhakrishnan points out. In this respect, philosophy may be looked upon as reflecting the spirit of a nation, as nurtured through the course of its history. Again, to set up a scheme of values is no less important for the metaphysician than to reflect upon the reality of things and to find out their essence. Of course, every community has its own set of values, woven into the mass of its common beliefs and social habits. A nation carries, more or less unconsciously, the congeries of its ideals of life which constantly need conscious evaluation. Thus, the ends of life involved instinctively in the life of a people have to be expressly formulated and systematically interpreted, if they are to remain effective. Moreover, the system or scheme of values that is evolved by a nation's life is in need of readjustment according to the changing demands of times. Mankind, it seems, tends to be involved in an unmeaning accumulation of facts

and information. On the other hand, there is the other extreme of sentimental flights. And it is for philosophy to seek a harmony between facts gathered and ideal aspirations cherished, by synthesizing the two in a coherent system of ideas which it constructs and in terms of which every element of experience is sought to be interpreted. Thus, the philosopher stabilizes human and social values by vindicating the fundamental significance they bear.

Our approach to philosophy must be somewhat clarified at this stage. Philosophy is not to be regarded merely as an intellectual abstraction. A system of rational interpretation of the "First Principles" should be understood in a specific context, that is, in relation to time and place. The index of man's intellectual endeavour can hardly escape a reference to the contemporary *milieu*; rather, it is to be regarded as embedded in the very stream of history; because intellect does not function *in vacuo*. It works upon the manifold materials of human life that are available. The life of a people expresses itself through new ventures in judging things. Philosophy has been found to be a major force in critical phases of civilization because it initiates dynamism in the face of stagnation and decadence. This is what happened in India when the Buddha came upon the scene—the period when confusion reigned supreme in the world of philosophical speculation. Looking to ancient Greece, we come across a similar intellectual void in the negativism and scepticism of the Sophists followed by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who integrated the genius of Greece and thus stabilized her national life. Again, it was the philosophical insight of Acharya Sankara in India that not only restored but also carried forward towards fresh directions the confused spirit of the people of India at a time when her genius was going to be torn asunder.

Now, the question remains: How far is the rôle of philosophy to be recognized in the scheme of a modern nation's life? In the first instance, the objection from the utilitarian standpoint is obvious. What good would philosophy do towards bringing material benefits for a nation? Philosophy can meet the challenge on the strength of its foundation on an unfailing and, at the same time, elevating level of life. Reflection of some kind or other is a need of man's being. Philosophy is an essential aid to life. Again, for a high standard of man's collective life, the free spirit of critical enquiry, intellectual humility and open-mindedness are vitally necessary. And these mental qualities are exactly what philosophy implies. Philosophical orientations may change with changing historical perspectives. But the demand for philosophizing seems likely to remain a potent factor making for a healthy order of society, though its forms and results may vary from time to time and from country to country.

The mind of a people, if it is to be kept dynamically alive, has to undergo a process of philosophical discipline. The critical faculty of man is apt to lose its clarity and strength amidst the mazes that everyday life presents. But, philosophical training which cultivates, to some extent, a dispassionate and critical attitude towards things and events may save an individual as well as a nation from mental confusion. Such philosophical discipline would, of course, mean a living appreciation of the fundamental philosophic tradition of a country. But it should never amount to a blind adherence to that tradition.

The lack of a stable philosophic background may affect the life of a nation in a twofold way. On the one hand, without philosophic background, it may tend to fritter away its vitality after ends that are not worth striving for. In these days of political turmoil in particular, when socio-political ideologies are rampant, people are apt to be swept away from the moorings of their cultural tradition and outlook. Here a philosophical training would come to the rescue by preserving individuality. But may not this attachment to the national culture lead towards a narrow regimentation of life? The danger is there. The mind of a people may be integrated, but in a wrong way—through dull uniformity. Here again, a philosophical trend in national life might keep the critical spirit awake to the truth of things and free of the spell of indoctrination. The menace of fascism and other pernicious forms of totalitarianism that threaten modern man at every stage may be combated. What we mean is that when the intellectual life of a people is philosophically attuned, its creative flow can retain its virility through the vicissitudes of political fortune.

Thus, the total integration of a nation's life through the progressive realization of a life-ideal is what we particularly stress. The vision of Plato's *Republic*, Moore's *Utopia* or even Gandhiji's *Rama-rajya* may be realized only if the true spirit of philosophy is inculcated on a harmonious and collective scale. The mental sensitivity and open-mindedness which philosophy implants are also the *sine qua non* of democracy, if it is to be worth the name. The value and integrity of the human personality is the crux of democracy; and it is for philosophy to vindicate this democratic heritage of man.

It is a commonplace to brand philosophy as irrelevant to life, the former dealing with the changeless world of reality and the latter with the transitory world of process. This unfortunate dichotomy may have its root in the order of the Greek city state where there prevailed the sharp divergence between the aristocratic class, who could afford philosophic speculation, and the slave population to whom the nobler pursuits of life were a closed book. But in India, a different tradition could grow, wherein the

general life of the people could be broadly attuned to the vision of the philosopher. A deeper harmony between philosophy and life, action and contemplation, was wrought, as we find it remarkably expounded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*.

So, the scale of values behind the life of a people must also guide the affairs of the state. This is what Plato visualized in his ideal state, when he prescribed that the real philosopher rule the "Republic." Of course, the very possibility of a Platonic "Republic" is an open question. It may be impracticable at the present stage of human civilization; nevertheless, it will remain an ideal for human society to achieve. Man's supreme endeavour will ever be directed towards the realization of an ideal social order where wisdom not impulse, reason not instinct, would be the guiding stars.

DEVABRATA SINHA

A FINE EXAMPLE

"Coincidence" has brought us the first issues of the new volumes of *The Adelphi*, *Question* and the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*. All these have had distinguished careers in pursuit of their different, all admirable, objects. *The Adelphi* tries to mingle the writings of established writers with those rising and needing encouragement, but for both it sets a high standard. *Question* is the journal of the Present Question Conference, which seeks, through annual public discussions of questions of fundamental importance to our time, to give depth to the general framework of contemporary thought.

Perhaps the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* has interest more specifically for the scholar but even the non-expert can find much to stimulate him.

All these, we must specially point out, are published by private associations and persons and hence are the fruit of spontaneous intellectual and artistic activity in their country. Not only do they flourish without government patronage, we should think they would regard such patronage with great misgivings. What Mr. Robert Newton, the actor, recently called "instigated" culture never has the same cultural value as the results of spontaneous cultural activity among the people; for, even if an official or semi-official body with plenty of money at its disposal could produce better results in the short run, the stifling of independence in the great mass of art-loving people is too bitter a price to pay. It is only when a large number of groups, working with the minimum of interference from official bodies, carry on enthusiastically, even with some wrangling and heated controversy, that ideas flourish and culture is enriched.

We deeply regret that today in India there is a tendency to look to the Government for every little thing. It is time that private associations and individuals undertook a greater share of the effort to spread knowledge and critical works. It will be a happy day when we find the spontaneous cultural activity of our people expressing itself in journals comparable to *The Adelphi*, *Question* and the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*.

THE WAY OF THE TRUE DEVOTEE

[The homely pen-name " **Dadu** " masks one who has been much in the world's activities, but been in them with the Indian tradition always in mind—that tradition which teaches how, through all the necessary work of the world, a true devotee can carry a mind undeflected from its high " line of life's meditation." In this essay " Dadu " offers a simple, yet sufficient, basis on which to build an understanding of the path of devotion: our ineluctable sense of identity. To discover the ultimate nature of human identity is also to find the Inner Self. But the way is long and only a constant remembrance of that inner, universal Presence, which " Dadu " addresses fervently as God, will give us strength to walk it.—ED.]

Merely repeating the name of God will not do: You do not seriously believe in His existence and yet you ever long for a vision of Him. Is not that the way of a madman? We shall be wrong in taking a man for a great devotee of God just because we find him shedding a tear and crying aloud, "O Lord, My God!" A man doing that may wear the mask of devotion, may be thought much of by many simple-minded people and feel his life blessed on that account. But that does not necessarily prove that he is a genuine believer or a fervent devotee. Devotion must be supported and fortified by a true knowledge of God's reality, otherwise all demonstrations will be but the passing emotion of a moment or rank hypocrisy.

Thou art, O God, there can be no doubt. All things that I see have taken shape and appearance because "Thou art." None could have leaped into existence from nothing. Nothing can come out of nothing. Parents, sisters and brothers, wives and husbands, daughters and sons, the whole host of relations and friends, the entire phenomenal cosmos, have unfolded themselves and assumed solidity only because "Thou art." We never doubt the truth of their existence. They are *pratyaksham*, objects of direct sense perception. Says Patanjali in one of his aphorisms: Among valid and legitimate proofs are: direct perception, inference, and the words of the Vedas and the Seers.

What pity that we cannot get at the truth of Thy existence, O Lord, Thou who art the inner Self, the Awareness, the Existence, that holds and sustains and manifests—in which all that live and move have their being! Thou art in me and outside of me, in land and water, sky, air and earth. The All-Indwelling and All-Encircling One, yet, alas! we fail to realize Thee, truest and most Real of all realities, we do not take Thee to our hearts like son or father!

My mind and feelings and senses have a grasp and perception of external objects, the things I see and

touch and smell; but woe is me that even today, at this late hour, I have not yet clung to that direct and intimate touch of Thine, transcending all earthly bliss. Alas! that I have not yet taken Thee to my heart of hearts with the warmth with which I have hugged my fleeting illusions, deceptive vanities of the world! For this, I still drag on a miserable life, drifting like a ship without a rudder, at the mercy of every wind and wave. My mind and senses have lulled me into a false dream and I have succumbed to a fatal infatuation like the drugged wooers of Circe. When I can bring myself to truly believe in Thee, the changing world vanishes from my sight. But my mind ever stands between Thee and me, hiding Thee from my awareness. Ever mind throws me into the world's whirlpool, where I toil and moil for nothing, like a bullock with bandaged eyes. To serve its own selfish ends, mind makes me an instrument of its own unholy lust and greed. Thus my portion is one of endless pain and sorrow and I have no rest nor peace.

When one has true and firm faith in Thy Presence, and rapt concentration on this, the small identities of the world merge in the all-engulfing light of Thy infinite existence as rivers merge in an ocean. One will then no longer puzzle at the cross-currents of life. The feet of the devotee will become firmly planted in truth only when understanding and accepting Thy glorious Presence. He will pass beyond the fear of losing Thee only when he has firm hold on Thee in the heaven of his heart.

If one loses Thee after a faint sense of Thy presence in the heart he may be sure that his meditation has not reached Thy true state of calm. But once this is achieved, is firm and sure by process of repeated practice or by spontaneous grace, the mind will not wholly lose its quiet and will be at rest even in the midst of the most trying ordeals. A thousand temptations will not then disturb its poise and balance. Thirst for worldly enjoyments will wither and die. The days and nights of the devotee will move serenely, or untouched by noise and tumult of the world.

When the heart is firmly fixed on ultimate Reality, the devotee is seized with longing to live in Spirit alone. When he goes out and moves about his eyes are ever inward drawn to where there are no semblances and names. He looks only at the essential nature behind all objects. He knows, without a doubt, the call of the heart and he takes that for his light and guide on life's pathway. All the fetters that have bound his mind fall off. Then he begins to see his Beloved inwardly and outwardly—everywhere, as the Great Consciousness, the Immortal Self, the Immutable and Indestructible Truth.

All prayers and worship and meditation have for their goal the attainment of this great Vision of Truth. Behind the limited conscious-

ness of every individual, lies, veiled and coiled, the Supreme Consciousness and Power which, at a command, can create, preserve and destroy. This power we worship and name Shakti, Chandi, Annapurna—the Mother of worlds, the spouse of Shiva, and by many other names. Nature, the Great Mother, still stands unrevealed to those who hide their light behind their own petty egos. Remove this ego, wipe it out and the great Mother will be manifest as Self-Consciousness. Make a dedication and sacrifice of your ego-sense at the Mother's feet, surrender yourself completely to Her, and you will come back to your own Self, find your eternal inheritance and your inalienable birthright. You will then be a channel for Her infinite Life-force, and all sense of separation from Her will die, leaving one indivisible unity of Consciousness.

Let us recapitulate the essentials. You are perfectly aware that "You are." The knowledge is inherent in Existence itself. This Existence is your real Being, the Self-luminous, effulgent Self, the Eternal Consciousness, and all the rest is unreality and nothing but vanity. This is the important thing to bear in mind.

Ignorance, the cause of bondage, consists in the failure to understand this simple yet fundamental Truth, the eternal Self-existent Truth and the Consciousness that goes with it. All the kaleidoscopic phenomena, the universal dynamism, is nothing but the play of the mind which creates countless forms of fancy and casts its glamour over them. "The ignorant mind, not knowing that the world is only something seen by the mind itself, clings to the multitudinousness of external objects." The senses, the mind's own offspring, prone to prey on externals by the very law of nature, lean and feed on them. Thus the mind and the senses turn our eyes away from and make us oblivious of the pure and unalloyed Consciousness which is our true Self. As long as the *Jiva* remains immersed in a dream and phantasy of his own making, he will be confined, cabined within his own ego. He has woven a network of forms and images, all of which are but a phantasmagoria of the mind, and has himself become entangled therein. But, in fact and in reality, he never was in bondage, nor ever will be. From his standpoint this is but a dream and an illusion, the hallucination and disease of a fevered brain.

When a man becomes firmly convinced of the divine Existence in his soul, he outgrows the passion and inertia which constitute the life of the ordinary mortal which, if heeded, drag him ultimately to ruin and disaster. These are the two great Asuras, the "un-divine" forces that beset the path of the devotee and his constant endeavour is to deal them a death-blow. Once he has deposed and destroyed these tyrants and enthroned himself firmly in Truth, the higher powers that lie dormant in his soul awaken and

manifest their glory. They take the devotee beyond the reach of darkness, fear and death to regions of plenary light, joy and immortal life. He goes beyond the slough of sorrow and despondency and enjoys the bliss of Nirvana!

Such is the crowning achievement of the great devotee, who has found the great Guru, and placed his life unreservedly at His feet. Of such, verily it is spoken in the Upanishads: "Rare indeed is that disciple, and rare also that Guru."

"DADU"

LAMP OF MY SOUL

Lamp of my soul, burn bravely in the dusk
Fed with the oil of tears from out my heart,
Shine boldly through the tangled undergrowth
In solitude, apart.

I have but rarely turned my weary eyes
Inward I fear, to dwell upon your flame,
But when the Night grew dark, the Path more steep,
Repentantly I came!

Humbly I seek and patiently I climb,
Therefore my soul, burn bravely through the Night,
Take for your oil these tears from out my heart
And guide me to God's sight.

HESPER LE GALLIENNE HUTCHINSON

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY *

"Too many of us in the West," says the translator of these two portly volumes, "still possess the view-point described by the Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu as that of the well-frog, who could see only the little circle of sky above his well, and imagined this to be the whole world." Thus we find even a notable Western scholar telling us that "the Dark Ages in Europe brought the world to its lowest cultural level," quite ignoring the fact that during that very period one of the most brilliant flowerings of human culture was taking place under the T'ang dynasty in China. Now at last we shall be able to see how a Chinese scholar who has had the advantage of Western training views the philosophy of his own country.

The translation of Dr. Fung Yu-lan's first volumes was originally published in China in 1937, but it has long been unobtainable in any Western country, and has now been reprinted with a new introductory section of errata and additional remarks. Vol. II, here published in English for the first time, covers the ensuing period from the 2nd century B C. to the early 20th century A.D. The scope of such a work is necessarily great, and the claim on the dust-jackets that "it remains the most complete work on the subject written in any language" might seem reasonable enough; yet in all fairness it should be pointed out that the late Professor Forke's *Geschichte der Chinesischen Philosophie*, which was printed in three quarto-sized volumes between the years 1927 and 1938, contains nearly twice as much matter and has a far greater number of Chinese characters in its foot-notes.

Dr. Fung gives a good, reliable account of Confucius and his followers, especially Mencius, but is less at his ease, as could only be expected, when he comes to deal with Lao Tzu, Yang Chu and the other early Taoists. Here so much is legendary or doubtful that a fully satisfactory chronological scheme has yet to be evolved. That is hardly an excuse, however, for the failure to give any adequate treatment to a writer and thinker of such outstanding quality as Lieh Tzu. In his book the opposition between Taoism and Confucianism is much less sharp than in Chuang Tzu, and Confucius himself is treated with greater respect. This alone is strong evidence for the priority of Lieh Tzu, for it is certain that the gulf between the two great systems widened as time went on. Forke discusses Lieh Tzu's work at considerable length, and gives good reasons for accepting the bulk of it as perfectly genuine. Dr. Fung, on the other hand, contents himself with the following foot-note: "Lieh Tzu, a Taoist philosopher, probably legendary, introduced by Chuang Tzu, and to whom a book called the Lieh Tzu has later been falsely attributed."

Though the number of philosophic schools continued to increase during the so-called Period of Classical Learning, that is, from the 2nd century B.C. onward, there were proportionately fewer original thinkers. Of these, perhaps the most notable was the Taoist mystic and alchemist Ko Hung, who lived from about 270 to 350 A.D. (the

* *A History of Chinese Philosophy*. By FUNG YU-LAN. Translated by DEREK BODDE. With Introduction, Notes, Bibliography and Index. Vol. I: The Period of the Philosophers: From the Beginnings to *Circa* 100 B.C. (xxxiv + 455 pp. 1952. 40*s*.) Vol. II: The Period of Classical Learning: From the Second Century B.C. to the 20th Century A.D. (xxv + 783 pp. 1953. 55*s*.) (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London)

date usually given for him is too early) and wrote a remarkable treatise under the name Pao P'u Tzu. Forke calls him the most important philosophical thinker between the Han and Sung dynasties, and compares him with Paracelsus; yet Dr. Fung can hardly find room to mention him at all, and omits his name altogether from the index.

Buddhist missionaries were now penetrating ever more deeply into China, while numerous Chinese pilgrims made the reverse journey into India in order to study and collect vast numbers of Buddhist texts for translation. For a long time this new religion absorbed the best energies of the most philosophically minded Chinese, although many were baffled by the difficulties inherent in the doctrine of reincarnation. Nearest akin to Taoist ideas were the teachings of the Ch'an sect, which appears to have made a deep impression on the Chinese. As its name implies, it encouraged the practice of personal meditation, which might in due course lead to the miracle of "instantaneous enlightenment."

The T'ang dynasty, during which Buddhism reached its apogee, also witnessed a notable revival of Confucianism, largely due to the efforts of the great man of letters, Han Yü. What is usually known as Neo-Confucianism, however, was an intellectual movement that only became dominant in the Sung dynasty, more than two centuries later. It was started by Chou Tun-i, who also borrowed extensively from religious Taoism, and continued through a line of followers which culminated in Chu Hsi, who may be said to have synthesized the ideas of his predecessors into one all-embracing system. Here we still find elements of both Taoism and Buddhism, but more especially the latter. In Chapter 14, Lu Chiu-yüan and Wang Shou-jên (better known as Wang Yang-ming) are coupled together rather surprisingly, for more than three centuries divided them, and they really have not much in common. The former was an opponent of Chu Hsi, the latter a Ming idealist.

The philosophy of the Ch'ing dynasty has been somewhat neglected by Western students, and understandably so, because there is nothing startlingly new in the doctrines propounded during that period. One fairly recent writer, K'ang Yu-wei, will not at any rate be soon forgotten, for he did his best to re-establish the fame of Confucius on an enduring basis, a laudable aim which has already met with considerable success, and will doubtless be furthered by the publication of the present work.

LIONEL GILES

Literatures of the East: An Appreciation. Edited by ERIC B. CEADEL; Introduction by A. J. ARBERRY. (Wisdom of the East Series, John Murray, London. xiii+194 pp. 1953. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

Delivered originally as lectures in Cambridge by members of the Faculty of Oriental Languages, this book is an excellent companion volume to the others in the series. An attempt has been made, and successfully, to stimulate the average reader's interest without frightening him by too severe a display of scholarship. The bibliographies at the end of each chapter are a welcome help to those in search of Eastern realms of gold.

The Regius Professor's introduction to Hebrew literature makes fascinating reading; Professor Levy's chapter on Persian and Mr. Ceadel's on Japanese have a grace and a lightness entirely in keeping with their subjects. By the same standards Mr. Wickens' appraisal of Arabic literature seems a trifle niggardly. One is indebted to Mr. Ceadel for his analysis—if one may use so cold a word for so charming a poetic form—of the *haiku*, the Japanese short poem which has only 17 syllables. And if anyone imagines that a *haiku* is as easy as it sounds, I commend him to page 180 of the book.

The chapter on Chinese literature is

more comprehensive, including as it does modern writers of Chinese, than, for example, the chapter on Indian literature, which is devoted exclusively to the years before Christ. It would, of course, be beyond the scope of this book to attempt anything more than the briefest sketch of a very vast field indeed.

The reader will notice a marked similarity of legend and phrase running like a thread, slender but strong, through the chapters; reminding him that at the earliest dawn of civilization mankind was akin. Professor Arberry's short but graceful introduction is worth quoting from :—

> To study with comprehension the literatures of the East is vastly to increase one's horizon and enjoyment. History has repeatedly shown that a renaissance of learning and artistic creation follows the discovery or rediscovery of alien cultures.

I think it was Macaulay who said that a shelf of English books outweighed in value all the literature of the East. It is heartwarming to know that we have travelled a long way since then.

K. D. NAYAR

Stories of Jesus. By MARGARET BULLOUGH; illustrated by T. D. GRICE. (Epworth Press and Methodist Publishing House, London. 139 pp. 1953. 6s.)

There is nothing specially original or distinctive about this book. Well and imaginatively written in simple language suited to the 8 to 12-year-olds for whom it is intended, it is just another addition to the already voluminous collection of books for children about the life and teaching of Jesus. The author's approach is the usual uncritical one of the orthodox believer in the Bible, in which historical and unhistorical, material, miraculous and possible, jostle one another in the same delightful but confusing way that they do in the Bible itself, and one wonders how far an intelligent 10-year-old of today would read before beginning to ask unanswerable questions.

The descriptions are vivid and give a clear impression of life in Palestine and of the environmental factors of peace and beauty that helped to mould the mind of the growing boy. These, combined with a home-life of unusual intimacy, a searching study of the Old Testament and the conviction born at his baptism and confirmed by the subsequent stages of his ministry, that it was his destiny to fulfil the age-old hope of his race for a heaven-sent Messiah to be their leader and king, gave form and coherence to the Gospel which he felt it his life's mission to proclaim, namely, " the Good News... about our Heavenly Father who loves us so dearly and who forgives us everything we do wrong the moment we are sorry and try to do better. " (p. 69)

The charm of the book is greatly enhanced by T. D. Grice's delightful illustrations in sepia and black.

MARGARET BARR

The Doubting Thomas Today. By RUSSELL P. DAVIES. (Philosophical Library, Inc., New York. 344 pp. 1953. $4 75)

This book is for Doubting Thomas, not about him. By super-imposing a history of revelation on an interpretation of world history, the author endeavours to establish that the " Master Mind " has a " Master Plan " for " the salvation of the world " from something unstated. The master plan concerns only the Western world and Christianity and, while according Zoroaster a place in the plan, Mr. Davies seems to imply that Islam happened in spite of the divine plan. India, China, Japan, are barely mentioned either for their religions or in the interpretation of " World History. "

Those whose doubts are about the exclusive claims of Christianity will

not have their faith restored by this book. Indeed it seems more likely that it will cause two doubts to grow where only one grew before, for the style is difficult, there is much imprecise language and use of coined phrases and catchwords, and there are sweeping assumptions about the very matters which cause doubts. We are told:

"If a formula which is in harmony with 20th century revelation were applied to its historical development, it should ring true. God is eternal, or he does not exist at all." (p. 13) "It is an inevitable conclusion that there should be a final and supreme purpose in creation and that this final purpose should concern man." (p. 17) "But Christ had accepted the destiny plotted in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah during that dark night at Gethsemane." (p. 229)

Doubting Thomas must unravel this sentence.

Mr. Davis has some interesting things to say of the present deficiencies of Protestantism in America and his aim is a worthy one, but (page 8) "The inevitable challenge remains: What are the facts of religion?"

BRUCE FINDLOW

More For Timothy. By VICTOR GOLLANCZ. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 1953.)

It is impossible to do justice to this book in a short review. And it is equally impossible for this reviewer to write in any way critically of it. It has so thrilled and delighted me that a pæan of praise and gratitude is more fitting than a critical review.

Ranging widely over all the major issues that confront us today the author is not content with easy answers. His book reveals an unusually keen mind and sensitive spirit struggling desperately to get down to bedrock and thrash out solutions to practical problems on the basis of eternal verities.

Victor Gollancz's background of orthodox Judaism combined with a personal devotion to Christ and his teaching give him an almost unique religious position and one of the highest possible value. Firmly grounded on the rock of his own ancient faith his deeply religious spirit and questing mind give to his pronouncements on religion a universal note that will appeal to all readers of THE ARYAN PATH. He has no use whatever for a church that lays claim to a permanent monopoly of truth, and he pleads, like Gandhiji, that children should be brought up with some knowledge of and reverence for religions other than their own.

Though by nature and inclination a teacher, Victor Gollancz graced the teaching profession only for two years, during which he proved so disturbingly successful in getting the boys of an English public school to think for themselves and so begin to break away from the bonds of ignorance and class prejudice in which they had been reared that he found himself dismissed, and turned his talents thereafter to the publishing of books, mostly concerned with the two matters which he believes to be of supreme practical importance for the world of today, socialism and pacifism. As a study in experimental pedagogics of absorbing interest to all teachers I commend the account of his two meteoric years at Repton.

All cruelty, oppression and injustice fill him with horror, as also do all theories of man as a fallen or impotent being. He believes supremely in the divine spark at the heart of humanity, even after having faced up, more honestly and searchingly than most people, the challenge of Belsen and Dachau, of flogging and capital punishment. His faith in God and in man is courageous and inspiring and those who would like to find out for themselves how he vindicates it intellectually and reveals it in an autobiography of singular frankness and charm should read this book.

MARGARET BARR

Lady Into Woman: A History of Women from Victoria to Elizabeth II. By VERA BRITTAIN. (Andrew Dakers, Ltd., London. xv+256 pp. 1953. 15s.)

Vera Brittain has chosen a subject which none but she could present so convincingly: the transmutation of lady into woman during the past fifty years. She does not confine herself to the suffragette movement of Mrs. Pankhurst in Britain, but describes the efforts of women in Asia, South Africa and America to emancipate themselves. Ours is a convulsive age of transition in which social customs have collapsed more swiftly than in the past. What in quieter times took centuries, today happens in a single generation.

In so far as her facts and personalities are concerned, Miss Brittain is impeccable. We certainly would not question her estimate of Dame Sybil Thorndike, who has proved that a woman can remain for years at the top of the theatrical profession without sacrificing personal fulfilment as wife and mother. Nor do we think Miss Brittain unpatriotic for being wiser than Mrs. Pankhurst and foreseeing, as did Olive Schreiner in South Africa, that respect for reason was unlikely to prevail in military societies. But we do think that she goes too far in assuming that compassion, forebearance and concern for individual life are feminine qualities in conflict with masculine achievement. These qualities have nothing whatever to do with sex.

Few men of sensibility would disagree that

> As Mrs. Pankhurst and Maude Royden perceived, war violates a profound biological urge in women. The woman who shouts for war, whatever her temporary gain, has been perverted by propaganda from her natural impulse to create and to save.

But it has occurred to more than one male, including Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi, that *men* who shout for war have been equally perverted by propaganda.

Miss Brittain has written a very readable history of women in the 20th century. She rightly claims that it is, in effect, the history of the human race. But she seems to have forgotten that ladies have become emancipated women before—in ancient India and Egypt, and in certain African negro tribes. It would make an interesting further study to find out why they "reverted."

Perhaps the truth is that feminine emancipation is not enough. Not merely ladies require emancipating, but the minds of all individuals, whether male or female. Until that happens, neither sex will be free to create that peaceful and intelligent society which Miss Brittain envisages, and which might best be described as the evolution of Man into Human Being.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

The Towering Wave By B. K. MALLIK. (Vincent Stuart, London. 226 pp. 1953. 15s.)

To many readers, Mr. Mallik's parable —a prophecy, allegory, what you will— may seem unnecessarily obscure. They are hereby exhorted to persevere through its tortuous fantasy for the sake of the precious truths embedded in it. The "story," ostensibly told at some unspecified date in the distant future, is of a dream, a vision and a search; and the moral underlying the story is that history is not the clash between reality and illusion but the recurrent clash between different types of illusion.

> The philosopher claimed that the Hindu, the Jew and the Greek as types stood out in what we call history for all time... If the Greek as an individualist emphasized individuality, he could not possibly agree with the Hindu who spurned individuality and emphasized unity. And both of them were sure to disagree with the Jew or the Christian who spurned both individuality and unity and emphasized community....

In other words, men are parochial in their loyalties and allegiances; there cannot be a variety of conflicting truths but only one absolute truth, and the quest for this is the book's major theme.

The people of the Search see that the illusory subjects of conflict: justice, equality, or whatever—bring no realization; and they accordingly evolve a new code of ethics, the ethics of mutual abstention. This is the essence of Mr. Mallik's message. It is hardly new: Mr. Mallik himself says that if Confucius, Lao-Tze and Buddha were alive today, all three "would be in perfect agreement with the ethics of mutual abstention." Nevertheless he works out the implications in the specific context of the mid-20th century with amazing insight. And for one reader at least, the rhythm of his prose evokes at least a passing recollection of Kafka and Max Picard. As in Picard's *The Flight from God*, the Flight in itself is a kind of entity, so in Mr. Mallik's book the Search becomes a potent symbol of what men may achieve when they liberate themselves from their own egoism and self-seeking.

J. P. HOGAN

Indian Foods and Nutrition. By MILDRED MCKIE KEITHAHN, M.D. (Author, Kodaikanal, Madras. 154 pp. 2nd edition. 1953. Re. 1/8)

This little book is wonderfully practical, offering valuable observations, suggestions and information. We read:

> At a rural centre...a woman came begging for food...*kera* on which she was standing was not only edible but nutritious and the cooked juice could be fed to the baby. In the small garden a dozen edible plants were found and the woman was helped to help herself.

Dr. Keithahn points out that the humblest home could and should have a kitchen garden:—

> Fertilized with composted night soil and watered with the waste from the kitchen and bath, anyone can grow a drumstick, plantain, agathy, or papaya tree and some vegetables fenced in with thorn. Vines like the gourds or pumpkin take no space as they vine over the house.

Dr. Keithahn says that her book was inspired by Gandhiji; and that she had soon realized after starting her medical practice that

> it was not costly western pills or injections that India needed: *it was food!*

India greatly needs knowledge of foods and their nutritive value. The practical and simple truths of this can be easily understood and should be learned by the rising generation so that they may benefit themselves and teach others. This booklet is a rich mine of such knowledge, practical and scientific; it is worth many times its cost.

E. P. T.

Yoga: The Way of Self-Fulfilment. By J. VIJAYATUNGA (Casement Publications, Ltd., London and Bombay. 48 pp. 1953. Re. 1/-)

From Vijayatunga, a well-known Singhalese writer and poet, comes a simple explanation of the complexity of Indian thought.

Shri Radhakrishnan's introduction says: "Shri Vijayatunga writes with distinction and his essay shows great insight into the spirit of Indian Culture, Hindu and Buddhist."

The author holds "that Yoga is a means of spiritual life and that it is at the same time a method of effecting a balance in our everyday life." It is this desirable balance that J. Vijayatunga thinks can be obtained by following the principles of Yoga. This essay carries a message and is a plea for sanity in order to solve world problems. As such it may be usefully read.

A. P.

Mahayogi: By R. R. DIVAKAR. (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. 288 pp. Re. 1/12)

The book is written in lucid and impressive language. The first six chapters give a vivid and graphic picture of Sri Aurobindo's early life, his exceptionally brilliant career at Cambridge and of his political activities. He was trained for the Indian Civil Service. There were two conflicting tendencies in his heart, fighting for supremacy, the urge for spiritual realization and the urge for the emancipation of Mother India. Both were equally powerful and the uniqueness of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy and *yoga* consist in reconciling and transmuting them in a higher synthesis. A brief account of the development of his spiritual life is given in the remaining five chapters of this book. The author has utilized the letters and works of Sri Aurobindo to explain the fundamentals of his philosophy and *yoga*. But this part of the book presents a contrast to the first part both in the matter and the method of its presentation. Most writers who have tried it have found this a hard nut to crack. They try to summarize the discussion on these two topics in the words of Sri Aurobindo, but one feels that the spirit is not fully expressed.

> His Philosophy starts with the Sat-Chit-Anand as the fountain-head of the two processes of involution and evolution. The involution begins with the descent of Supermind, and passes down gradually to overmind, higher mind, mind, psyche, life and matter. Here it reaches its limit, and the reverse process of evolution begins from this point till it reaches the Supermind and finally Sat-Chit-Anand, leading to the development of integral personality and emancipation of humanity as a whole.

What the exact implications of these fundamentals are, remains a problem to ordinary readers. The indefiniteness or suggestiveness is due perhaps to the essentially poetical genius of Sri Aurobindo. For he confesses to Dilip Kumar Roy in a letter that *he was never, never a philosopher*! He was a poet, and a politician, but *not* a philosopher. (p. 181)

K. V. GAJENDRAGADKAR

Autobiography of Marie Louise Clemens. (Bruce Humphries, Inc., Boston, U.S.A. ix + 316 pp. 1953. $ 3.75)

According to Dr. J. A. Hadfield, the eminent English psychiatrist, one of the clear distinctions between the "ideal" and the "phantasy" is that we work for the "ideal" but identify ourselves personally, here and now, with the "phantasy." The good man works to "bring the Christ to birth" within himself. The psychological case, out of touch with reality, imagines he *is* the Christ. The autobiography under review, with its theme of "I-me-my," belongs most definitely to the phantasy group. And if anyone has been tempted to indulge in pleasing adolescent "dreams" of how charming they are, how marvellous their work ("surely everyone loves me, the humble possessor of occult powers, Helping Humanity under the Special Guidance of Great Masters of Secret Societies!") then—if such dreamers have any discrimination left—let them use this book as a mirror. It should go a long way to effect a cure.

E.W.

Collected Poems of DALLAS KENMARE. (Ed. J. Burrow and Co., Ltd., Cheltenham. xiv+186 pp. 1953. 16s.)

These poems, nearly all in "free verse," were written or published at intervals between 1929 and 1950. The author reveals a keen appreciation of music and flowers: indeed, of what is vaguely called "Nature." Moreover she can express the sorrow of lost love and still maintain a fortitude reminiscent of a poet of whom she has written a study—Robert Browning. We realize very soon that she has a

genuinely poetic mind, but she would have done well to write in stricter metres and with more concentration. There is a tendency toward verbosity. That, however, is the normal effect of writing "free verse": there are no banks to prevent the river of words from overflowing. To examine the compression practised by Chinese and Japanese poets is well worth the time of any Western writer.

Here is a fair specimen, though brief, of Miss Kenmare's verse-craft :—

Grey, grey, everywhere grey—
Day after day after day of endless grey,
The long relentless gloom of the English grey,
Grey days and grey clouds and the waters grey.

But oh, not grey the light of the heart,
The deep fervour of dreams;
Not grey the landscape of love,
And the hidden rose.

CLIFFORD BAX

La Même : En Vingt-trois Episodes. (The Same Story in Twenty-three Episodes). By M. LAHY-HOLLEBECQUE. (Les Editeurs Français Réunis, Paris. 1952.)

The author is well known for her studies in child psychology; she has written several books on the subject : *The French School-children and the War*; *The Child, A Cause with a Future*; *The House of the Child* and *Children-Charmers*, an anthology of writers of books for children.

She herself is one of those "charmers" in her books *Once Upon a Time* and *Agnes and the Wide World*. Her works of literary criticism are numerous : *Anatole France and Women*, *The Feminism of Scheherazade*, etc.

She created in 1935 the society "Cinema for the Young" and in 1937 the "Theatre for Young Spectators." Always interested in Indian thought, she followed in the University the Sanskrit classes of Finot and those of Sylvain Lévy on "Indian Civilization."

Her last book, which has just appeared, defends a cause for which she has struggled during 40 years. Each of the "23 episodes" is the result of her own experiences. "Social injustice," she writes to me, "is deeply felt by children" and adds that this innate sense of justice would persist in them if education did not—very often—deform their souls. "I shall always struggle for the transformation of a world which tends to lower and crush its pariahs." Each of the 23 episodes shows us a different child who has suffered from family circumstances or social ones. Some of them made martyrs by drunkenness; by parents who fight with each other and want to divorce; by a loving but unmindful mother who is a cinema star; others have been deceived by priests whose false promises have turned them away from the Church, "that forest of cold and lifeless columns." One child was led to crime through bad cinemas to which unthinking parents too often take their children.

In the last chaper, called "We will Save Ourselves Alone," the children of one of the "Republics of Children" (built up by orphans) formulate their own claims :—

We are too often misunderstood by parents or teachers who forget they have been young themselves.

We often live in the midst of ugliness : no gardens, no flowers, etc.

We are often bored during holidays.

We want our coming into the world to be a joy, not a burden.

We want good papers : no more Tarzans, gangsters, crimes and wars, and good books.

Don't take us to your films which teach us fear, anguish and disgust.

Make us become the generation of Peace. We want to love all the children of the world. If you don't help us, we will try to save ourselves alone.

Mme. Lahy-Hollebecque is the widow of Professor Lahy, a savant and great patriot, who was killed in 1943 by the Gestapo. She has followed the researches of her husband and helped him in his laboratory. She belongs to the Comité National des Ecrivains.

ANDREE KARPELES-HOGMAN

The Vocabulary of Politics. By T. D. WELDON. (A Pelican Book. Penguin Books, Ltd., London. 199 pp. 1953. Rs. 2/-)

The present work is a survey of the fundamental issues of political philosophy from the standpoint of logical positivism animated by a sceptical and censorious spirit. If the author is right, all political philosophy of the past consists of vacuous statements without meaning and without use in current life. The philosophy of the democratic State embodying the creative ideas of Rousseau and Kant, in which the citizen is both subject and sovereign at once, later developed by the Mills in defence of liberal individualism ; the philosophy of Hegel with his dialectic and spiritual view of history and growth and the doctrine of Karl Marx with its dialectic materialism which is exercising so tantalizing and explosive an influence today, are all discussed to show that the principles underlying them are beyond proof, their influence deriving largely through a confusion in the use of words !

But the author holds that this does not reduce us to ultimate scepticism and subjectivism. It is possible to have empirical judgments as in art appreciation and the selection of candidates for office based on intimate knowledge of particulars and persons.

Idealist criticism of such a position would proceed by showing that knowledge by inspection involves in the last analysis the very general principles rejected so strenuously ! If the author's is the last word, many other fields of knowledge besides politics would be dissolved, in fact all imparting of knowledge and skill in any line. The root of the error lies in confusing the presence of principles *in* the mind with their appearance *to* it.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

A New Approach to Psychical Research. By ANTONY FLEW. (C. A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London. viii + 161 pp. 1953. 10s. 6*d*.)

This book rightly emphasizes the need for clear terms of definition. Yet, since no terms are confusion-proof, the ability to "catch the idea" also seems needed. Dare we call it the germ of ESP ? (Mr. Flew considers the popular term "telepathy" obsolescent). The purpose of the book is, he says, "frankly popular," yet even this term is difficult to assess, when one opens the book at a passage like this (p. 125) on psi-gamma (the term suggested by Thouless and Wiesner to replace ESP):

> It [psi-gamma] is upsetting also in apparently forcing us to admit two new species of action-at-a-distance ; one spatial (to go alongside gravity, and one temporal (to which mnemic phenomena alone possibly offer a parallel). Again we must not panic : we must not abandon the so called Postulate of Spatio-Temporal Continuity, properly construed. For this should be taken as an (invaluable) *heuristic maxim*. . . .

The observational records are simpler reading, and cover the ground well in a brief survey, each chapter having its own bibliography, mainly S.P.R. sources. Anecdotes are retailed with the amused air that characterizes more than one modern investigator, and which we suspect may be a form of self-protection. Undoubtedly the high incidence of fraud in connection with psychism and spiritualism encourages scepticism, and Mr. Flew duly repeats well-known "proven" cases. But he does record some exceedingly interesting data, particularly on paranormal faculties. Some of the facts might well bear other conclusions—he himself mentions the danger of "stopping a statistical inquiry at the point which suits your own pre-possessions" and instances Dr. Coover's psychical experiments at Stanford University, U.S.A., whose findings gave an apparently negative result, but which, when analyzed later by Dr. Thouless, showed that the previous categorical condemnation was quite unjustified, and, had Dr. Coover carried on further, he could not have avoided the same conclusion. One can study Mr. Flew's evidence and reasonings therefore with an open mind.

W. E. W.

Bombay-Karnatak Inscriptions. Edited by N. LAKSHMINARAYAN RAO, M.A. (South-Indian Inscriptions, Vol. XI, Part II. Department of Archæology, Government of India, Madras. 272 pp. 1953. Rs. 11/12; 18*s*. 6*d*.)

This volume is a continuation of the South Indian Inscriptions (Texts) Series published by the Government of India's Department of Archæology and relates to the Bijapur and Dharwar districts of Bombay-Karnatak. It comprises 93 inscriptions, all of them belonging to the reign of the Western Chalukya King, Tribhuvanamalla Vikramaditya VI. The Introduction indicates the light that some of these inscriptions throw on the problems of chronology pertaining to the reign of that monarch and gives some new facts about the feudatories who flourished under his patronage. Most of the inscriptions relate to the 11th century and are of value beyond chronological and political interests.

The period was one in which Jaina poets flourished, the greatest of whom was Abhinava-Pampa, who is referred to in one of the inscriptions. Nagadeva, Madhavabhatta, Chandrabhattakavi and Nagarjuna Pandita are other poets mentioned in the collection. The records testify to the patronage of religion as well as of the sciences and arts by the rulers of the time, who accepted this function as part of their duty (*rajadharma*). The formula which enshrines the grant of land or money to temples or groups of learned persons reveals the extent and variety of the attainments expected of the beneficiaries: *yamaniyama* (control of body and mind), *svadhyaya* (study), *dhyana* (meditation), *dharana* (concentration) and *mauna* (introversion) by way of personal character and habits. The range of studies was wide, including logic, grammar, the Puranas, poetry, drama, *bharata natya* and even *kama-shastra*.

The volume will be useful in reconstructing the cultural life of the times as well as in throwing light on history and language.

M. A. VENKATA RAO

Thoreau's Walden. Abridged and edited with Introduction and Notes by K. R. SRINIVASA IYENGAR. (Andhra University, Waltair. 129 pp. 1953. Rs. 2/-)

Prof. K. R. S. Iyengar has made a distinctive selection from Thoreau's *Walden*, including many of the passages of simple beauty that fill the original. Thoreau is regarded by some as one of the most perfect writers of America.

Professor Iyengar has also brought out the unconventional personality of Thoreau, of whose classic it has been written: "apart from its poetic record of an idyllic adventure, *Walden* is the practical philosophy of rebellion against the world's cowardly habit of living."

A. P.

Hellenism and the Modern World. (Six Talks on the Radio-diffusion Française and the BBC.) By GILBERT MURRAY. O. M. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 60 pp. 1953. 5*s*.)

Hellenism, yes: it is Gilbert Murray's strong point. But the way in which he relates it to the modern world is another matter. Many, for instance, will find unconvincing his comparison of the Europe of the past 40 years with the period of breakdown of the Hellenistic civilization. There may be an analogy, but it is surely too generalized to be significant.

Gilbert Murray has faith in the United Nations and in America. Even if Europe goes under, he says:—

we know that there is waiting across the Atlantic a greater Rome which may at the best establish a true world Peace, and will at the worst maintain in an ocean of barbarism a large and enduring island of true Hellenic life.

But a recent report by two economists, published in America, concludes that America "cannot survive as an isolated island of abundance in an ocean of poverty," and it is interesting that this aspect does not seem even to impinge upon Gilbert Murray's liberal conscience. Indeed he is a characteristic 19th-century Liberal in that he never allows reality to mar his ideals. "It is not an effete or corrupt generation that responded with such instant enthusiasm to the vow of dedication and service undertaken by our young queen" is how he describes 40 million bemused people gazing at their television sets. He continues :—

...not a cynical world which, after the disastrous failure of its hopes in the League of Nations, has so almost unanimously pledged itself again to follow the same practical ideal; not hardened or unrepentant community which is pouring out such a vast flood of charity and remedial measures from every possible source...in its longing to redeem the wrongs of the Second World War.

But has even one per cent of the population of the member countries of the United Nations the faintest idea of the UN's function, failures and achievements ? Does one per cent give voluntarily, in the course of any one year, as much as the price of a packet of cigarettes " to redeem the wrongs of the Second World War ? "

J. P. HOGAN

Citizens of the World, Communism, Hunger, and Foreign Policy. By STRINGFELLOW BARR. Preface by JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 285 pp. 1953. 13*s.* 6*d.*)

This is a polemical book, written in that tradition of practical idealism native to American liberalism. Stringfellow Barr believes in the brotherhood of man, and he is shocked by the distance that riches and power are placing between the warm-hearted American peoples and the poverty-stricken majority of mankind. He warns them against blindly building a "free world" citadel of law and order on the sands of hunger, disease, illiteracy and despair. With an exaggeration that may be justified by the urgency of his message, he exposes the wrong-headedness of "cold war" policies, full of force and empty of hope, based on a purely military diagnosis of the Communist threat. He urges his country to give wholehearted backing to a genuinely international programme of economic and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, through a World Development Authority, which he would like to see supervised by a directly elected "Peoples' World Assembly." In a telling comparison with the Tennessee Valley Authority, he shows that this would not be "un-American," and he proceeds to demolish, one by one, many arguments that are often mustered by persons who would prefer to do little or nothing. Here he is at the top of his form, and a delight to read.

The heart of this book is sound. But if Mr. Barr could give credit where credit is due to post-war American policies, which could not afford an underestimation of the element of force in Communist practices, and also view more critically the actual value of popular world assemblies at this hour, his message would go over more effectively among thoughtful persons. He should keep to the point—having made it so sharp by his eloquence and compassion.

ALAN DE RUSETT

The Pursuit of Happiness. By HOWARD MUMFORD JONES. (The William W. Cook Foundation Lectures. Harvard University Press, U. S. A.; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. xiv + 168 pp. 1953. 22*s.* 6*d.*)

The author of this book is Professor of English at Harvard University, but as its contents were delivered to the University of Michigan under the Cook endowment for "a distinguished Lecturership on American Institutions," readers might expect a discussion of problems in political philosophy or science. They will find something more entertaining: an ironical history of American ways of life for the last two hundred years as viewed by an American in the light of the Williamsburg Declaration of Rights (1776).

The method followed is to contrast some various and consecutive or coexisting ideas of how happiness might be pursued, ranging from: (1) the witnessing in another life from "a theatre box," as it were, the "sight of hell-torments" of the damned (p. 2); through (2) the Stoic or Epicurean escape of a Washington from a sea of troubles to his Sabine farm like an English gentleman (pp. 79-80); (3) the vague Bostonian transcendentalism where "the imaginative faculty of the soul must be fed with objects immense and eternal...always giving health" (p. 117); (4) the commercial expansiveness of God's country of Boosters, Rotarians, Optimist Clubs and other incentives to acquisitiveness (pp. 51, 122-3); (5) the cocktail, lounge-lizard conception of a "good time" (pp. 138-140); to (6) and lastly the concentration on "adjustment," "self-expression," "escape from repression" and mental laxatives in general (pp. 153-8).

Conceptions of how to be happy naturally overlap and combine in the oddest ways, as is illustrated by the amusing citations of some court decisions, by the novels of Fennimore Cooper and Sinclair Lewis, by Benjamin Franklin's *Way to Wealth*, by Emerson's essays, by William James' psychology and so on.

But underlying the whole compilation is the political philosophy that to make "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" a prime, if not the sole, proper aim of government, was a blunder. The author calls it "the transformation of happiness into a political concept" (p. 92), but he is modestly reticent as to a substitute.

Professor Jones's objections to the formula seem to rest on misconceptions. He admits that though happiness, like other feelings, cannot be defined, everybody knows what the word means (p. 5). Yet he does not consistently remember the distinction between the meaning of a word (say "true" or "beautiful") and the different applications of that meaning by different people. Different people certainly seek happiness in different ways and are often disappointed. Some, perhaps correctly, think *their* happiness depends on the misery of others. But it is clearly meant that the *claim* to pursue happiness is common to all men, and, if they conflict, claims must be balanced to decide which is the *right*. Where exactly the balance rests may be dubious, but all the eccentricities in the author's case-list only show that no constitution or legislative act is judge-proof.

If it be urged that to promote the greatest happiness even of the greatest number is not the whole duty of man, since it seems to neglect just distribution, we must remember the usual qualification—"everyone to count for one"—which, if it is not a mere repetition of the first part of the formula, must be a tentative, perhaps inconsistent, admission at least of the justice of equity.

Have we then before us a satire not only on American ways of life but upon Welfare States, the "divine tactic" of *laissez-faire*, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, in fact an offensive on all fronts?

There are naturally, and properly enough, a few terms and phrases in the book unfamiliar to a British reader, but the strangest is the word "dramatization."

E. F. CARRITT

A NOTE

In printing his article in our January issue we mentioned Shri P. T. Raju as belonging to the Andhra University. This was an oversight. Shri Raju is now working at Jaswant College, Jodhpur.

The activities of the Communist Party of India are disquieting. Their anarchic ideas and beliefs are brought out by Sita Ram Goel in his booklet *C. P. I. Conspires for Civil-War.* It begins with a comparison of the Draft Constitutions with their Preambles, of the Communist parties in different countries, their aims and politics. The Communist Party of India seems to expect India to go the way of China and Russia in the next few years. Shri Goel thinks that India holds the first place in the present plan of Russia for world conquest, and that much of the impetus is given to the C. P. I. by the fact of the constant hunger and poverty of the masses of this country.

According to the Statement of Policy of the C. P. I., 1951, : "All action of the masses in defence of their interests to achieve their liberation is sacrosanct." It does not seem to matter how this object is achieved.

Shri Goel gives documentary quotations indicating that the Communist Party of India is modelled on the Communist Party of China, which indicates a possible resort to civil war. Its policy is based on the claim that conditions in China before the Communist Revolution were the same as those in India of the present day and lead to the need of setting up "a people's liberation army led by the Communist Party" which is fervently advocated. The C. P. I. also holds that "armed struggle is the main form of struggle in the national liberation struggle in many countries and semi-colonies."

The intentions behind the Communist Party propaganda are clearly revealed, writes Sita Ram Goel, and could "turn India into another Korea." The C. P. I., he claims, now intends having strongholds in the North of India as the South of India has been made sufficiently strong. He stresses the need for suppressing these unhealthy and dangerous social and political undercurrents.

A. P.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"_____ *ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Shri G. Ramachandran, Educational Adviser to the Government of Madras, where Basic Education has made headway, lectured at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on January 19th and 21st on "Revolution Through Education" and "Ideals and Methods of Basic Education," respectively.

The unsatisfactory nature of education today demanded action. Basic Education was on the brink of a real revolution, peaceful, constructive, educational and continuing. Gandhiji had said that activity in a Basic school should be related to the fundamental facts in the child's environment and reach out, at the child's level, to fundamental needs in that environment. Any craft meeting those conditions and involving many processes lent itself to Basic Education—agriculture, khadi, coir, carpentry, mothercraft, etc.

Basic Education gave the idea of understanding Nature and living in harmony with it. It imparted manual skills and produced mental alertness, self-reliance and a sense of responsibility. It might not solve all India's problems but it would fit children to face their own.

The natural environment, craft work and the social environment formed its equilateral base, but it did not stop there or discard books. At certain points Indian education had to be in terms of the Indian tradition, using the word in the highest philosophical sense, and of Indian facts and needs, but India was part of the world. The challenge of the future was to build up the unity of mankind.

Some of the implications of Pantheism, regarding which many erroneous ideas prevail, are judiciously analyzed in the leading article entitled "Twentieth Century Pantheism" in *Manas* (Los Angeles) for January 27th.

Whatever the limitations of science and however objectionable its practices, "the work and the thought of men who study the forces of nature have had the effect of restoring a feeling of reverence for natural reality. This we may call the Pantheism of the twentieth century." It is not mere "nature worship," but is an irristible, intuitive feeling that there is the "One in many," an essential unity that pervades all things in spite of the infinite diversities. Pantheism "affords to every individual a place of importance in the scheme of things," for human beings too are integral expressions of the One Self, and as such we do not have to go far in search for It—we *are* It. "The crisis in Pantheistic faith," we are told, "always comes at the point where the One ceases to be the One, reappearing as the Many." Pantheism, therefore, needs elucidation in the world of today. Science is of little help here, except in laying down the great principle that law reigns in the universe and that it is no respecter of persons. And the Pantheist looks for law and meaning and order in nature. This also clears the great question about the nature of man. He cannot be an accidental collection of atoms, fortuitously thrown together, but is essentially a rational being, "giving rational shape to the very structure of existence ...constituting within himself the principle of continuity in nature—of immortality, in fact."

The need of the modern world is the ordering of relationships between man and his fellows and man and nature. "We cannot live for long in a world without principles of order," we are

told in closing. "The question is, what principles shall we adopt?"

On December 18th at the London Branch of the Indian Institute of Culture an account of the growth of the World University Service was given by its General Secretary in the United Kingdom, Mr. Mayer. This was a story of co-operation between people with little in common, and more often than not antagonistic towards each other, which started in 1920. Five girls of different student groups had met in Vienna at the invitation of Miss Ruth Rowse of the World Student Christian Federation. Believing that the future of a country depended on its supply of professional men, Miss Rowse undertook the task of alleviating the appalling lot of professors and students in post-war Central Europe, on condition that they formed their own relief organization. When the appeal for help was sent out large sums of money were raised in England and Holland. Once the bond of fellowship had been established the European Student Relief Organization, as it was then called, spread over all Europe. After a lull in the early '20s its services had increased with every year. Between one and two million pounds sterling were sent to China during the 1930s, when help was also given to refugees from Nazism. In the aftermath of the last war much work was done in Europe, the Near East and S.E. Asia. It was now extending its activity to Africa, and in due course it would look to Latin America. The immediate task was to salvage something out of the wreck that is Korea.

The principles of the organization were: (1) to encourage people to help themselves and to help others; (2) to co-operate with all international agencies; (3) to maintain autonomous national bodies for the administration of relief; (4) to give help impartially on the criterion of proven need only.

The tendency to work for money and leisure is on the increase. Work that pays is sought, but usually executed hurriedly with minimum interest and exertion. Moreover, there are innumerable gadgets that help to save time. But is the time saved put to the best possible use? The prospects for leisure are bright but the problem as to how to spend it remains.

Prof. David Riesman of the University of Chicago describes in "Some Observations on Changes in Leisure Activities" (*Perspectives U.S.A.*, Fall, 1953) changes in the leisure problems of many people in the West. After much consideration and analysis he interestingly suggests that we take children's play at its best, which includes experiences of mastery, control and competence, as a model for freeing leisure from its modern burdens. He writes:—

> Play seems to reside in a margin, often a narrow one, between tasks that are too demanding and those that are not demanding enough to require the excited concentration of a good play....Thus, play would seem to consist in part of giving ourselves tasks, useless in any immediate sense, that challenge us but do not overwhelm us—tasks that allow us to practise our skills on the universe when not too much is at stake.

Professor Riesman takes care to emphasize that these remarks should not be restricted to physical activities, for children are "naturally gifted with the capacity for imaginative play."

This problem of leisure has been taken up in THE ARYAN PATH several times. In 1931, Prof. C. E. M. Joad wrote on "The Civilized Use of Work and Leisure," and in 1932 on "The Leisure of the Future." In 1934, Miss Cicely Hamilton wrote on "The Leisured World" when it was pointed out that the divorce of knowledge and virtue constituted the problem of leisure. In our January 1953 issue, Miss Elizabeth Cross says in her article "Time and Money Today" that "It is only in our attitude of mind that we may become independent and turn time into eternity."